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From the Editor…
Welcome to the Spring /Summer 2013 issue of the Journal of Transportation Management!
This issue of the Journal contains an article on dimensions of airline profitability, an article on
trucking HOS rules, an article on paratransit, an article on trucking transportation options, and an
article on a cross cultural assessment of the logistics/supply chain typology across three countries.
The first article investigates the ongoing evolution of the U.S. airline industry under deregulation,
and utilizes the Service Quality Model to analyze long-term implications. The second article
explores the history of hours of service regulations for U.S. motor carriers and investigates the
changes to individual carrier profitability and productivity from the last major change to those
regulations in 2003. The third article reports on a decision support system (DSS) that can aid mass
transit authorities in evaluating paratransit service performance, and examines application of the
model in the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA). The fourth article studies the topic of
trucking industry transportation options and evaluates potential benefits, while considering obstacles
and possible resolutions to these issues. The fifth article compares the three dimensions of the
Bowersox Daugherty (1987) logistics strategy typology among five disparate countries and reports
on the robustness of the Typology across these countries.
At the Journal, we are continuing to make a number of changes that will improve the visibility of
JTM, and improve its position in the supply chain publishing world. These include registering and
updating journal information with several publishing guides, placing the journal content with the
EBSCO, Gale and JSTOR databases faculty have access to, and placing abstracts of all past journal
articles on an open area of the DNA Journal web page. Full journal article PDF’s continue to be
available to subscribers on the web page at www.deltanualpha.org
I look forward to hearing from you our readers with questions, comments and article submissions.
The submission guidelines are included at the end of this issue’s articles and I encourage both
academics and practitioners to consider submitting an article to the Journal. Also included in this
issue is a subscription form and I hope you will subscribe personally, and/or encourage your libraries
to subscribe.
John C. Taylor, Ph.D.
Editor, Journal of Transportation Management
Chairman, Department of Marketing and Supply Chain Management
School of Business Administration
Wayne State University
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THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AIRLINE PROFITABILITY
AND PASSENGER SATISFACTION
Kent N. Gourdin
College of Charleston
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the ongoing evolution of the U.S. airline industry under deregulation. After
losing money for most of the past 35 years, carriers have made structural changes to their business
models that have proven to be, at least in the short term, very profitable. After delineating these
management actions, the paper examines their impact on passengers. The author utilizes the Service
Quality Model to analyze the long-term implications of this new operating paradigm for passenger
satisfaction. Based on this analysis the paper goes on to suggest several actions management could
take to improve satisfaction. Finally, conclusions are offered and areas for additional research
suggested.
INTRODUCTION
The U.S. airline industry has been in a state of
instability since 1978. Deregulation, for better
or worse, put the business of air transportation
back into the hands of managers who were, after
years of government regulation, free to decide
what routes to serve, what fares to charge, and
how best to meet the needs of their passengers
while (hopefully) earning a profit. As the
ensuing decades proved, the free market can be a
tough place for an airline to survive in, let alone
prosper. The 1980s saw a flood of new airlines
entering the industry, often competing with the
established (or legacy) carriers solely on the
basis of low fares. By the latter part of the
decade and into the 1990s, many firms realized
that low price was difficult to sustain as a firm’s
only competitive advantage. Companies began
failing in large numbers as the legacy carriers
learned to leverage their route structures and
higher service levels to attract passengers while
selectively lowering prices to compete with new
entrants. Unfortunately, the inability to adapt to
an open market also quickly claimed some of the
nation’s oldest airlines: Braniff International in
1982, Western Airlines in 1986, and both Eastern
and Pan Am in 1991.
The business environment became even worse in
the 2000s as carrier managers were forced to

deal with rising fuel, security, and general
operating costs while confronting an extremely
price-sensitive customer base demanding the
impossible: low fares and high service levels.
As shown in Table 1, the volatility in annual
industry earnings from 2000-2011 was
staggering.
However, by 2009 there were clear signs that
U.S. airlines had made structural changes to
their business models that could very well signal
a permanent turnaround in their fortunes. After
delineating these management actions, this paper
will examine their impact on passengers
utilizing the Service Quality Model (Zeithaml,
Berry and Parasuraman, 1985) to look at the
long-term implications of this new operating
paradigm for passenger satisfaction. Finally,
conclusions will be drawn and areas for
additional research suggested.
A NEW REALITY
This section of the paper reviews a number of
management actions that have shaped the
industry since deregulation, and the impact of
those actions on passengers.
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TABLE 1
OPERATING PROFIT/LOSS FOR U.S. CARRIERS 2000-2011
Year

Operating Profit/Loss
(Thousands of Dollars)
7,014,004
-10,318,784
-8,565,745
-2,092,538
-1,489,673
447,623
7,639,841
9,343,743
-3,350,129
2,334,971
10,516,933
7,121,315

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Source: Research and Innovative Technology Administration
Bureau of Transportation Statistics F41 Schedule P12 Data
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements_Financial.aspx?Data=6
Management Actions
Management actions that have been stood out in
recent years are discussed next and could be
grouped into categories that include mergers,
fees, flight reductions, fares, and fuel costs.
Mergers
While airline mergers have been common since
the beginning of deregulation, they reached a
critical mass in the past decade. As seen in
Table 2, many of the so-called legacy carriers
that were household names in 1978 have
disappeared, either because they failed outright,
or merged with the survivors. In fact, American
and US Airways are contemplating a union that
would arguably be the last one possible without
running afoul of anti-trust laws (Spector and
Carey, 2012). As a result of this consolidation,
the companies have been able to impose various
fees on passengers, reduce the number of flights
and raise fares, actions that have significantly
improved their profitability but adversely
8
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affected customers. Each of these business
decisions will be discussed in more detail below.
Fees
The airlines have gradually imposed a myriad of
charges for amenities and services that
historically had been included in the fare, a
process known as un- or de-bundling.
Beginning with checked luggage and reservation
charges, there are fees now for booking a ticket
over the phone, reserving certain seats, boarding
an airplane early, printing a boarding pass at the
airport, and even carrying on a bag (Garrow,
Hotle and Mumbower, 2012). The profit
potential becomes obvious after examining a
hypothetical airplane carrying 100 passengers
each paying an average domestic $146 fare
($292 round-trip) and noting how many
customers, on average, are needed to cover the
cost of the flight. Twenty-nine people will be
required to meet fuel expenses, with another 20
covering personnel salaries; 16 passenger fares
will be allocated to ownership costs, 14 to

TABLE 2
MAJOR U.S. AIRLINES IN 1978
Airline
American
Braniff
Continental
Delta
Eastern
National
Northwest
Pan Am
TWA
Western
United

Current Status
Still operating, exploring merger with US Airwaysi
Ceased operations, 1982ii
Merged with United, 2010iii
Still operating
Filed for Bankruptcy, 1989iv
Merged with Pan Am, 1980v
Merged with Delta, 2008vi
Filed for Bankruptcy, 1991vii
Merged with American, 2001viii
Merged with Delta, 1987ix
Still operating

(Endnotes)
i
Carey, Susan. “AMR, US Airways Talks Draw Closer,” The Wall Street Journal, September 1, 2012, p. B3.
ii
http://www.braniffpages.com/syhistory.html
iii
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/breaking/chi-united-continental-pilots-vote-to-authorize-strike20120718,0,2280435.story
iv
http://articles.latimes.com/1989-03-10/news/mn-1205_1_eastern-airlines
v
http://www.nationalsundowners.com/about/history.php
vi
http://www.northwestairlines.com
vii
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-01-08/news/mn-8037_1_united-airlines
vii
http://stlouis.cbslocal.com/2011/04/09/american-airlines-buyout-of-twa-completed-ten-years-ago-today/
ix
http://deltamuseum.org/M_Education_DeltaHistory_Facts_Family_Tree_Western_Timetable.htm

various government fees and taxes, and 11 to
maintenance. Nine tickets will cover “other”
costs such as catering, delivering lost bags,
rental of airport facilities, marketing, legal fees,
etc. With 99 passengers accounted for, that
leaves only one covering profit. Ancillary
revenue, on the other hand, supplements the
flight by $18 per person or $1800 total
(McCartney, 2012a). The results speak for
themselves. In the first three months of 2012,
U.S. carriers earned $816 million in baggage
fees and $631 million in reservation change fees
(Jones, 2012), all of which are imposed along
with the various government taxes and fees
collected as additions to the fare.
Flight Reductions
For years, airline managers realized they were
offering too many seats, but competitive

pressures made it impossible for any single
carrier to reduce their capacity for fear of ceding
business to a competitor. However, industry
consolidation has reached the point where the
remaining airlines have been able to successfully
pull back on the number of flights they operate,
with a concomitant positive impact on load
factors. As shown in Table 3, the number of
flights offered by U.S. airlines rose steadily from
2000, peaking in 2005, and then falling to their
lowest level in 2011. Load factors, on the other
hand, have trended upward for the entire decade,
also reaching their peak at slightly over 82% in
2011. The end result is fewer aircraft carrying
more passengers, which is good news for the
firm, a fact confirmed in a recent study by Lin
utilizing Activity-Based Costing and Data
Envelopment Analysis to illustrate the power of
lowering costs and raising load factors on
schedules services (Lin, 2012).
Spring/Summer 2013
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TABLE 3
OPERATING DATA FOR U.S. CARRIERS 200-2011
Year

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Passengers Moved
(All Airports)
665,486,803
621,369,048
612,777,682
644,234,973
700,230,727
735,104,668
741,098,199
766,626,582
740,460,933
701,164,455
717,744,056
728,351,972

Flights
(All Airports)
8,493,297
8,221,751
8,675,945
10,136,163
10,699,663
10,825,881
10,521,442
10,671,436
10,202,004
9,542,320
9,499,044
9,455,032

Load Factor
(Passenger Miles
as a Percentage of
Available Seat-Miles)
72.33
70.00
71.78
73.46
75.48
77.64
79.23
79.93
79.54
80.41
82.07
82.10

Source: Research and Innovative Technology Administration
Bureau of Transportation Statistics F41 Schedule P12 Data
http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements_Financial.aspx?Data=6
Fares
Table 4 shows average U.S. domestic fares in
current and constant dollars from 1995-2011. In
current terms, fares have risen 24.5% over the
period from $292 in 1995 to $364 in 2011; while
in real dollars, however, fares have actually
fallen almost 16% since 1995. Year-to-year
fluctuations, while generally upward, have been
relatively modest with the largest annual change
a 10.4% drop in 2009. In line with the earlier
discussion regarding industry flight reductions,
the 8.3% price increases in both 2010 and 2011
may indicate consolidation is having a positive
impact (from management’s point of view) on
prices as well. Unfortunately, passengers are
having an increasingly difficult time determining
how and when to buy. The proliferation of
online booking options usually beginning with
lowest price can easily confuse a buyer. In fact,
even airline websites offer fares that, while
10
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appearing low, may involve ridiculously
circuitous routings that can more than double the
elapsed time of the trip.
Fuel Costs
Coping with rising fuel costs is an on-going
challenge for carrier management and the
impetus for many of the strategic changes
already discussed. As shown in Table 5, doubledigit year-to-year increases, both in the United
States and abroad, became the norm in 2003,
although the volatility inherent in oil prices
made managing these costs even harder. For
example, fuel was 46% more expensive in 2008
than in 2007, but in 2009 the price fell 38% only
to rise again 18% in 2010. Rather than
increasing fares, surcharges are often used to
recoup higher fuel costs because they can be
easily manipulated as market conditions change.
In addition, the passenger perceives that the fare

TABLE 4
ANNUAL U.S. DOMESTIC AVERAGE ITINERARY FARE IN
CURRENT AND CONSTANT DOLLARS

Year

Average
Fare ($)
(in Current
Dollars)

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

292
277
287
309
324
339
321
312
315
305
307
329
325
346
310
336
364

Percent
Change
from
Previous
Year
(in
Current
Dollars)

-5.3
3.8
7.6
4.7
4.7
-5.4
-2.6
1.0
-3.2
.6
6.9
-1.0
6.5
-10.4
8.3
8.3

Cumulutive
Percent
Change
from 1995

Average
Fare ($)
(in 1995
Dollars*)

(in Current
Dollars)

-5.3
-1.7
5.8
10.8
16.0
9.7
6.9
7.9
4.5
5.2
12.4
11.3
18.5
6.2
15.0
24.5

Percent
Change
from
Previous
Year
(in 1995
Dollars*)

292
269
273
289
296
300
276
265
261
246
240
248
239
245
220
235
247

Cumulutive
Percent
Change
from 1995
(in 1995
Dollars*)

-8.0
1.5
6.0
2.5
1.3
-8.0
-4.1
-1.3
-5.7
-2.7
3.6
-3.7
2.6
-10.1
6.5
4.9

-8.0
-6.7
-1.1
1.4
2.7
-5.6
-9.4
-10.6
-15.7
-17.9
-15.0
-18.2
-16.1
-24.5
-19.6
-15.6

Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, http://www.bts.gov/programs/economics_and_finance/
air_travel_price_index/html/annual.html
* Rate calculated using Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index.
Note: Percent change based on unrounded numbers.
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TABLE 5
AIRLINE FUEL COST AND CONSUMPTION 2000-2011
(U.S. CARRIERS – SCHEDULED)
Domestic
Year/
Percent Consumption
Change
(Million
Gallons)
2000
13,903.7
2001
13,112.1
%
change
over
2000
-5.69%
2002
12,287.2
%
change
over
2001
-6.29%
2003
12,417.0
%
change
over
2002
1.06%
2004
13,380.0
%
change
over
2003
7.76%
2005
13,284.2
%
change
over
2004
-.72%
2006
13,019.4
%
change
over
2005
-1.99%
2007
12,998.8
%
change
over
2006
-.16%
2008
12,469.4
%
change
over
2007
-4.07%
2009
11,147.4
%
change
over
2008
-10.60%
2010
11,056.2
%
change
over
2009
-.82%
2011
10,863.6
%
change
over

Domestic
Cost
(Million
Dollars)

2010

-1.74%

Domestic
Cost per
Gallon
(Dollars)

International
Consumption
(Million
Gallons)

International
Cost
(Million
Dollars)

International
Cost per
Gallon
(Dollars)

Total
Consumption
(Million
Gallons)

Total
Cost
(Million
Dollars)

Total
Cost per
Gallon
(Dollars)

10,810.6
10,024.7

.78
.76

5,122.5
4,955.6

4,387.8
3,989.5

.86
.81

19,026.2
18,067.6

15,198.4
14,014.2

.8
.7

-7.27%
8,602.9

-1.67%
.70

-3.26%
4,571.6

-9.08%
3,334.8

-6.01%
.73

-5.04%
16,858.7

-7.79%
11,937.7

-2.9%
.7

-14.18%
10,315.4

-8.42%
.83

-7.75%
4,451.0

-16.41%
3,838.2

-9.39%
.86

-6.69%
16,868.0

-14.82%
14,153.7

-8.71%
.8

19.91%
15,141.2

18.65%
1.13

-2.64%
4,764.7

15.10%
5,690.7

18.21%
1.19

.06%
18,144.7

18.56%
20,831.9

18.5%
1.1

46.78%
21,682.9

36.22%
1.63

7.05%
5,040.3

48.26%
8,600.8

38.5%
1.71

7.57%
18,324.5

47.18%
30,283.7

36.83%
1.6

43.20%
25,105.4

44.24%
1.93

5.78%
5,220.3

51.14%
10,535.2

42.87%
2.02

.99%
18,239.7

45.37%
35,640.6

43.95%
1.9

15.78%
26,889.9

18.14%
2.07

3.57%
5,428.0

22.49%
11,685.0

18.27%
2.15

-.46%
18,426.8

17.69%
38,584.9

18.24%
2.0

7.15%
37,194.9

7.32%
2.98

3.98%
5,508.9

10.91%
17,773.5

.67%
3.23

1.03%
17,978.4

8.26%
54,968.4

7.16%
3.0

38.27%
21,168.5

44.14%
1.9

1.49%
5,086.6

52.11%
9,514.4

49.87%
1.87

-2.43%
16,234.0

42.46%
30,682.9

46.01%
1.8

-43.09%
24,791.7

-36.34%
2.24

-7.67%
5,246.4

-46.47%
11,626.7

-42.02%
2.22

-9.70%
16,302.6

-44.18
36,418.4

-38.18%
2.2

17.12%
31,345.1

18.08%
2.89

3.14%
5,521.1

22.20%
15,536.3

18.48%
2.81

.42%
16,384.7

18.69%
46,881.4

18.19%
2.8

26.43%

28.67%

5.24%

33.63%

26.98%

.5%

28.73%

28.08%

Source: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, http://www.transtats.bts.gov/fuel.asp?pn=0&display=data1
12
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has not risen, but the price of fuel has, which is
beyond the company’s control.
Impact on Passengers
The above airline practices have had a major
impact on passengers. These impacts are
discussed next and relate to mergers, fees, flight
reductions, and fares.
Mergers
There are now fewer U.S. airlines to choose
from, especially for overseas travel. As the
survivors rationalize their routes and realign
their hubs, multiple stop flights are becoming
more common as passengers hopscotch from
hub to hub over what used to be a one stop trip.
Frequent Flier programs have been merged, with
negative implications for virtually everyone.
Delta Airlines, for example had three levels of
elite frequent fliers prior to their merger with
Northwest: Silver, Gold, and Platinum. A fourth
tier, Diamond, was added after the merger which
had the practical effect of shifting the existing
categories downward. In addition, the sheer
number of members, especially in the lowest
elite tiers, now works against receiving an
upgrade to business class or even claiming an
award ticket (McCartney, 2012b). On a recent
domestic flight, there were 38 coach passengers
on the wait list for a seat upgrade on a 120 seat
aircraft. Needless to say, the chances of anyone
below Platinum receiving an upgrade were
virtually non-existent. This dilution of their
loyalty programs should be viewed with concern
by managers, given the findings of a recent study
that frequent flier programs are strongly
associated with behavioral loyalty for business
and frequent travelers, the companies’ most
profitable customers (Dolnical et al., 2011).
Fees
Supplementary fees have arguably become the
most frustrating aspect of flying today. The
2012 American Customer Satisfaction Index

rated airlines in the bottom three among 47
industries evaluated for customer satisfaction
(Carey, 2012). Similarly, the JD Powers and
Associates 2012 North American Airline
Satisfaction Study found that, after two years of
consecutive industry improvements, overall
passenger satisfaction declined slightly, with
costs and fees (specifically related to baggage)
playing a key role in that reduction
(autos.jdpower.com., 2012). Carriers have
realized the profit potential inherent in charging
for ancillary goods and services, and they have
become more creative in determining what they
can demand a fee for. Customers have been
paying for tangibles such as food, beverages,
paper tickets, headsets, pillows and blankets for
some time. Given that air transport is primarily
a service industry, future revenue opportunities
lie in charging for intangibles, several of which
have already been mentioned. Other items under
consideration by various airlines include fees for
aisle and window seats, which would
significantly impact, for example, families
wanting to sit together (Mayerowitz, 2012), and
allowing passengers to pay for the privilege of
exiting the airplane early (Jones, 2012). Indeed,
customers can be forgiven for wondering where
the upcharges will end. One study suggested
adopting passenger weight as a major fare
determinant (Bhatta, 2012). Given the direct
relationship between aircraft operating cost and
weight, charging a 200 pound person a higher
price than a 100 pound individual does not seem
unreasonable. Irish low-cost carrier Ryanair has
a truly imaginative CEO who has, in the past,
suggested charging passengers to use the toilet
on-board the aircraft (Massey, 2012). While
most critics view his comments as a publicity
stunt, such a move does not seem beyond the
realm of possibility.
There are also fees and taxes added to the ticket
price that are required by the U.S. and foreign
governments. The total fare quoted to the
customer includes all of these and they are easily
identified if the buyer cares to see them.
Checking an economy fare from Orlando to
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Tokyo shows a base fare of $1127.40 plus
$724.90 in taxes and carrier-imposed fees for a
total charge of $1852.30. Examining those
figures in more detail shows the carrier-levied
charges constitute $654 with the remaining
$101.90 spread out over seven various charges
imposed by the U.S. and Japanese governments.
As stated by the airline, these non-government
costs represent “Carrier-imposed surcharges
stated separately from the base fare on some
international itineraries” (Delta, 2012). A logical
assumption would be that at least part of it is to
cover higher fuel costs, but there is really no way
to tell.
There are, from the passengers’ standpoint,
several problems with these types of fees. First,
once they are imposed, they rarely go away.
Second, the relationship between fares and these
charges is unclear so the danger is that fares can
be raised by more than the amount needed to
cover the fee(s), essentially turning them into a
money-making proposition. As an example, fuel
surcharges by U.S. airlines have risen 53% since
April 2011, while the price of fuel has increased
24% (Martin, 2012a). Finally, as nations grapple
with future societal issues that embrace the
airline industry (security, emissions, economic
development, etc.), fees are likely to proliferate.
For example, the European Union’s (EU)
emissions trading system (ETS) went into effect
for airlines on January 1, 2012, and applies to all
carriers regardless of nationality operating
flights to or from Europe (Wall Street Journal
Editorial, 2011). Delta, United-Continental,
American and US Airways immediately imposed
a $6 per round trip ticket surcharge on European
routes, although some estimates suggest that
complying with the program could cost the
airlines about 3% of the fare per passenger
(Jansen, 2012). The airlines did not immediately
acknowledge that the $6 increase was
attributable to ETS program compliance, nor is it
explicitly reflected on any website. Perhaps it is
included in the Carrier Imposed Surcharge
discussed earlier.
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Flight Reductions
As was mentioned earlier, fewer and fuller
flights have been a direct result of industry
consolidation, a clear benefit to the carrier as
every departure is virtually guaranteed to be, for
all practical purposes, full. However, passengers
do not typically share management’s enthusiasm
for full aircraft. The boarding process alone
becomes more problematic and takes longer to
complete. Because so many people want to
carry on larger bags, securing overhead storage
space becomes very important. Most airlines
have historically required passengers to follow
some form of zone policy to smooth the
boarding process: business class passengers go
on first, followed by those seated in Zone 1, then
Zone 2, etc. Today, however, after business
class, there are multiple categories allowing
various elite passengers to board before even
getting to Zone 1(which used to include the elite
customers). The inevitable result is that
overhead space fills before late-boarding
passengers can be accommodated, thus
disrupting the boarding process as they try and
figure out where to stow their bag(s).
Ultimately, some luggage must then be checked,
but the fee cannot be collected at this late stage,
so these customers do not pay when others have.
Fares
As explained earlier, there are clear indications
that fares will continue to increase: seat
capacity has been reduced, load factors are
increasing and fuel costs remain highly unstable.
Unfortunately for management, consumers do
not really differentiate between fares and fees;
they are, for all practical purposes, one in the
same so that, to consumers, raising the latter
means the former increases as well. As
explained earlier, Delta provides a complete
breakdown of fees which are added to a base
fare. For a comparable route, US Airways
quotes a base fare almost double that of Delta,
but with a much smaller amount listed for taxes
and fees (US Airways, 2012). In both cases the
total customer cost is essentially the same. With

upward pressure on both fares and fees,
customers should be able to tell what component
of each goes into the total cost they pay.
Summary
Clearly, airlines, like any other enterprise, must
make money in order to survive and grow.
Hopefully, managers are able to earn profits

from satisfied customers through their return
business. After years of losing money, carriers
are profitable again and seem poised to remain
that way. But, if the previous discussion is any
indication, virtually all of the actions taken to
turn the businesses around, while successful in
that regard, have shifted costs to passengers,
reduced value-added services, and generally
diminished the travel experience. In the next
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section, the Service Quality Model will be
introduced to evaluate the longer term
implications of these actions for both airline
profitability and customer satisfaction.
SERVICE QUALITY MODEL
Because airlines are a service industry, the
Service Quality Model depicted in Figure 1, is
useful in illustrating how customer
dissatisfaction can develop. Ignoring the arrows,
the model represents the basic marketing
process. That is, the chart is divided into two
parts: customers are on the top, management on
the bottom. Managers must first learn what
customers expect in terms of service. Once
management understands their customers’ needs
they can put together a service mix that will
satisfy them. The customer benefits offered by
the firm must be communicated to the buyers so
that they understand why the firm provides more
value than a competitor. That value must then
be delivered to the customer in a way that meets
their expectations. If the service the buyer
receives meets their expectations, then they will
be satisfied and the firm will profit. The arrows,
or Service Quality Gaps, depicted in the model
represent potential sources of customer
dissatisfaction. Each of these Gaps will be
explained below.

but is unwilling or unable to satisfy their needs.
Perhaps customer expectations are too high or
the firm simply lacks the resources to adequately
meet them. Alternatively, customers may not be
sufficiently aware of their “true” travel needs so
that their stated desires are inconsistent with
their actual requirements. Again, the service
mix developed and offered to customers does
not meet their expectations, and dissatisfaction
results.
Gap 3- Staff-Passenger Interactions
Gap 3 is an especially troubling one because it
signifies the situation where managers know
what customers want and have developed a
high-value offering to meet those needs, but that
service is poorly delivered. For example, the
passenger may be satisfied with the airline’s
reservation and ticketing process, but the gate
agent is rude and refuses to change a seat
assignment. Thus, the customer is dissatisfied
with the whole encounter (see Gap 5). Often the
difficulty is that the only carrier employee the
passenger comes into contact with is the flight
attendant, ticket agent, or customer service
representative. If this person is upset for some
reason or simply disinterested, he or she can
undermine all of management’s best efforts to
provide quality service.

Gap 1: Understanding Customer Needs

Gap 4 – Execution of Services

Gap 1 illustrates the situation when management
does not really understand their customers’
needs. For example, managers might assume
that passengers desire an inflight amenity which,
in fact, they do not. Either insufficient market
research has been performed or the results have
been misinterpreted. Whatever the reason,
management cannot hope to design and deliver
quality service if they do not completely
understand what their customers want.

Gap 4 is created when the organization promises
something to the customer that is subsequently
not provided. For example, the airline promises
that passengers will receive their checked bags
once the aircraft arrives at the destination
airport. Unfortunately, for a variety of reasons,
bags are misrouted or lost, and do not arrive with
the customer. While most people are reunited
with their luggage relatively quickly, passenger
resentment for this situation has increased with
the arrival of baggage fees which are typically
not refunded when a bag is mishandled, leading
to customer dissatisfaction (Gap 5).

Gap 2: Satisfying Customer Needs
Gap 2 opens when management does know what
their customers desire (i.e. Gap 1 does not exist)
16
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Gap 5 – Performance vs. Expectations
Gap 5 is the most critical opening, because it
reflects a situation in which the service received
by customers is different than what they
expected. The buyer is dissatisfied because their
actual experience was less than what they
anticipated. On the other hand, the customer
may actually experience better service than what
they were prepared for, but this situation
presents its own challenges and is beyond the
scope of this paper. Gap 5 also results when any
of the other four Gaps open. However, Gap 5
may also open by itself. Note that satisfactory
performance results from the interaction of
factors that the managers can control (the
interior layout of the aircraft, employees) and
those that they cannot (other customers, the
passenger’s emotional state). Thus, a customer
flying on a crowded, noisy airplane may be
unhappy with the experience even if the service
is fine. Similarly, a person who is unhappy,
irritated, or simply having a bad day, may be
disposed to find fault with very minor company
mistakes.
External forces (i.e. laws, governmental
regulations, weather, etc.) can also have an
impact on the level of service provided by an
airline. For example, winter weather can disrupt
flight operations and strand passengers,
sometimes for days. Also, new government
regulations now penalize airlines for ramp/
tarmac delays once passengers have boarded. As
a result airlines have erred on the side of
cancelling flights whenever winter weather
threatens which has exacerbated service failures.
In addition, air traffic control requirements can
adversely impact airline performance as well.
Naturally, situations such as these can have a
detrimental impact on customer service even
though the company has no control over the
factors causing them. The challenge for
managers is to minimize the size and occurrence
of service quality gaps by understanding the
needs of customers, providing a service mix that
meets those needs better than the competition,

and constantly monitoring customer satisfaction
so that corrective action can be taken
immediately if required.
RECONCILING THE NEW AIRLINE
MANAGEMENT PARADIGM
WITH CUSTOMER SATISFACTION
Based on the financial information presented
earlier, U.S. airlines are doing better than they
have in years. Flight reductions have led to
higher load-factors, fares are rising, and ancillary
fees are proving to be especially lucrative. As a
result, profits are up. However, none of these
factors are particularly appealing from the
passenger’s point of view implying less schedule
choice, more crowded airplanes, and higher
costs. In fact, complaints filed by customers
with the U.S. Department of Transportation
against U.S. Carriers are up almost 8% for the
first five months of 2012 versus the same period
in 2011 (Airconsumer.gov., 2012). When
viewed in the context of the Service Quality
Model, this rising level of customer
dissatisfaction represents a widening of Gap 5,
as a result of Gap 2: i.e. managers know their
actions are unpopular with customers, but
business realities require that these steps be
taken anyway. What, if anything, should
management do to mitigate Gap 5 and improve
overall customer satisfaction? There are several
options.
Do Nothing
Perhaps no management action needs to be
taken. Load factors are up, operating costs are
down, and profitability is increasing for the first
time in years. As a result, management may see
a modest increase in the number of customer
complaints as a small price to pay for continuing
a business model that is both sustainable and
profitable. A study by Steven, Dong and Dresner
found that market concentration moderates the
relationship between satisfaction and
profitability for the US airlines. Carriers that
operate in concentrated markets have fewer
incentives to satisfy their customers than those
Spring/Summer 2013
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that serve more competitive markets (Steven,
Dong and Dresner, 2012). The latest round of
industry consolidation means customer
alternatives are reduced to a smaller number of
airlines all following similar strategies, so there
is little incentive for passengers to switch
carriers. The end result of these changes is that
market power has shifted from customers back
to managers, with all that change implies.
Realign Carrier Customer Service to Fit
Today’s Environment
There are some steps management could take to
enhance the overall customer experience. First,
the collection of fees must be streamlined to
eliminate the passenger perception that they are
being nickeled-and-dimed to death. The reality
is that customers find some fees reasonable
(priority boarding, preferred seating, upgrades
and WiFi) while viewing others (checked
baggage) as just the opposite (McCartney,
2012c). Airlines should consider re-bundling
some charges into a passenger service fee that
everyone pays, similar to what hotels have
instituted in the form of a resort fee to cover
telephone, internet, fitness center, etc. For an
airline, such a fee could cover one checked bag,
entertainment, snacks, perhaps internet, but
every passenger would pay the fee. There would
probably be initial customer dissatisfaction, but
the managers could mitigate this resistance by
offering enough bundled value that passengers
felt like they were getting something even
without checking a bag. Furthermore, the
presence of a relatively fixed fee would
eliminate uncertainty and the feeling of
constantly being asked to pay for something.
Resort fees that are transparent and fully
disclosed prior to check-in have been have been
accepted by customers as preferable to multiple
charges for individual items. The airlines could
find the same thing happens with a passenger
service fee.
Second, baggage simply must be managed better.
The implementation of fees for checked luggage
forced more bags into the cabin, slowing both
18
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the security screening and aircraft loading
processes. If everyone paid the passenger
service fee as discussed earlier, perhaps the
amount and size of carry-on items would
decrease. While the company might experience
an increase in the quantity of checked bags, they,
along with most airports, already have the
infrastructure in place to absorb them. In
addition, size and weight limits for cabin bags
need to be enforced prior to boarding and
preferably before security.
Third, fare transparency should be improved.
Vague explanations regarding surcharges, taxes
and fees need to be eliminated in favor of full
disclosure regarding the true cost of a ticket.
Spirit Airlines was sued in August 2012 for
collecting a passenger usage fee ranging from $9
to $17 per flight segment that appeared to be an
officially imposed charge but was, according to
the lawsuit, a scheme to collect more money
from passengers while advertising a low base
fare (Martin, 2012b). Surcharges are especially
worrisome because they are intended to be
temporary and typically are applied by the
carrier. In theory, these should decline or
disappear altogether once they are no longer
needed to deal with a specific situation. In the
absence of clarity, the risk to the customer is that
these charges become permanent.
Finally, a system should be developed to allow
for the immediate on-board reporting of
passenger-related aircraft problems. As flights
are reduced and older aircraft are retired, those
that remain are flying more. For example, an
aircraft might depart from Atlanta for a flight to
Amsterdam where it stays for a few hours before
flying on to New Delhi. After turning around
there, it returns to Amsterdam before continuing
back to Atlanta where it is turned back around to
make the same circuit again. A passenger
confronted with a reading light that does not
work, a seat that does not recline, or worst of all,
a defective entertainment system, is likely to be
stuck with that situation for the duration of their
flight because higher load factors mean less
opportunity to change seats. The passenger

might advise a flight attendant of the deficiency,
but, realistically speaking, there is really nothing
they can do other than document the issue in the
hope that it will be taken care of at some point.
Given the short turn-around times and the lack
of comprehensive maintenance support available
at en-route stops, the likelihood is that multiple
passengers will be dissatisfied as a result of what
should be a relatively minor problem. If the
aircraft is turned as quickly at its domestic
domicile (where maintenance activities are
presumably concentrated), the problem may
remain unresolved for a lengthy period of time,
resulting in a number of dissatisfied customers.
Given the prevalence and sophistication of
inflight entertainment systems, passengers
should be able to register seat-specific
complaints that can be (a) viewed immediately
by flight service personnel in case there is
something they can do to remedy the problem,
and (b) sent via aircraft systems directly to
maintenance personnel on the ground if in-flight
correction is impossible.
A Balanced Approach
Earlier research (Gourdin and Kloppenborg,
1991) found that, up until deregulation,
passengers and managers tended to agree on
what constituted quality airline service. As a
result, customers were satisfied and the airlines
were profitable. After 1978, customers became
very price sensitive, demanding the high service
levels they were used to together with extremely
low fares. Managers focused on cutting costs in
order to compete in a free-market environment,
which meant paring down services. This
polarization at opposite ends of the quality
spectrum generated passenger dissatisfaction
that persisted for 30 years. But the recent
events discussed in this paper have forced
passengers to redefine their expectations to fit
the new reality, presenting airline managers with
an opportunity they must not squander by doing
nothing. The suggestions made in the above
section would go a long way towards improving
the customer experience at relatively little cost to
the company.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER
RESEARCH
The U.S. airline industry has experienced more
structural changes in the last five years than at
any time since deregulation occurred in 1978.
Because passenger expectations for air service
quality remained locked in the halcyon days of
the 1950s and 1960s, managers were unable to
reconcile customer demand for high levels of
service and low fares with the economic realities
of competing in a free market. As illustrated
with the Service Quality Model, customer
dissatisfaction was the result as were decades of
money-losing airline operations. Recent
industry consolidation has reduced the number
of competitors and forced passengers to modify
their service expectations, which has been good
news for managers. As the latter move to
improve their respective bottom lines, they need
to ensure that they don’t alienate their
customers. This paper offers executives several
options for improving customer satisfaction
while continuing to enhance profitability, a
seemingly unattainable goal before now.
Additional investigation into customer price
sensitivity would be invaluable in determining,
for example, what amount makes sense for a
passenger service fee and to identify new service
offerings that people will pay for. One
successful innovation is the enhanced economy
seating options now being offered by some
carriers to those who are willing to pay extra for
a bit more legroom and seat comfort on long
flights. Perhaps similar revenue opportunities
exist in offering improved dining options to
coach passengers as well. Additional research
into buyer behavior would also be useful in
helping managers understand what they can
charge for and what they cannot, knowledge
especially useful for a carrier with extensive
overseas routes.
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U.S. MOTOR CARRIER HOURS OF SERVICE REGULATIONS:
THEIR IMPACT ON CARRIER PROFITABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY
Ahren Johnston
Missouri State University
ABSTRACT
This paper discusses the history of hours of service regulations for U.S. motor carriers and
investigates the changes to individual carrier profitability and productivity from the last major
change to those regulations in 2003. The results of the analysis indicate that operating ratio
worsened and sales per employee improved, and return on assets and return on equity were
unchanged due to hours of service changes. The implications of these results given the recent
changes to hours of service regulations in 2011 are also discussed.

INTRODUCTION
With the major change to the Federal Motor
Carrier Administration (FMCSA) Hours of
Service regulations announced in December
2011(HOS, 2011), there has been increased
interest in how this will impact motor carriers.
Prior to the publication of the final rule, several
studies regarding highway safety and the health
of truck drivers were published (Hall and
Mukherjee, 2008; Jovanis et al., 2005; Min,
2009; Saltzman and Belzer, 2002), but little or
no research has been conducted on the impact of
HOS on the profitability and productivity of
individual firms. The Regulatory Impact
Analysis (FMCSA, 2010) includes an estimate
of the cost of reduced productivity at the macro
level but not at the firm level. The estimates
used to calculate reduced productivity were also
called into question in a paper prepared for the
American Trucking Association by Edgeworth
Economics (2011). Due to the questions about
research on the impact of HOS on costs and
productivity at the macro level, and a lack of
research at the firm level; this paper will
investigate the impact of changes to HOS at the

firm level, which may also add some insight into
the macro-economic impact of these changes.
The last major change to HOS occurred in 2003
and went into effect in January of 2004. The
2003 HOS reduced the allowable on-duty time
per work/rest cycle1 by one hour, increased the
allowable driving time per work/rest cycle by
one hour, and decreased the on-duty and work
time per day by two hours. However, with the
addition of the 34 hour restart2, the maximum
on-duty and driving time per week were
increased by 14 and 7 hours and the maximum
long-term average on-duty and driving hours
were increased by approximately 21 and 14
hours. These dramatic changes led to a period of
uncertainty concerning the future of HOS with
multiple law suits, court actions, and acts of
Congress, which resulted in the issuance of the
2011 HOS.
Before the final 2011 HOS were publicized,
there was discussion about decreasing the onduty and driving hours per work/rest cycle by
one to two hours, but the final rule retained the
14 hour on duty and 11 hour driving limits per
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work/rest cycle from the 2003 HOS. The most
significant change to the 2011 HOS is the
requirement of a minimum 30 minute break after
8 hours of driving and severely limiting the use
of the 34 hour restart. Under the new rule, the
34 hour restart can only be used once per week
(168 hours) and must include two time periods
between 1:00 am and 5:00 am. The once per
week restriction is intended to allow a driver to
work one long week but force him to follow that
with a short week, and the 1:00 am through 5:00
am restriction is intended to allow night drivers
two periods of night rest to recover (FMCSA,
2011). While these changes will not impact the
maximum daily or weekly driving or on-duty
times, they will restrict the maximum average
weekly driving and on-duty times to a point
halfway between those allowed under the 1962
HOS and the 2003 HOS. Therefore looking at
the impact of the 2003 HOS changes to motor
carrier profitability and productivity should give
some insight into the impact of the 2011 HOS on
motor carriers.
This paper investigates the actual impact of the
last major change to the HOS on profitability
and productivity of publicly traded motor
carriers. Quarterly data from 1997-2010 for 14
publicly traded motor carriers was used. To see
the impact on profitability, Operating Ratio (OR)
and Return on Assets (ROA) were dependent
variables in two separate models. The variable
of interest was a dummy variable with a value of
zero for the time periods before the change to
HOS (1997-2003) and a value of one for the
time periods after the change (2004-2010).
Various control variables were also included to
account for economic and regulatory changes
that took place in the sample period. To see the
impact on productivity, a similar model was
tested with sales per employee as the dependent
variable. Results of the estimations indicate that
24
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the 2004 HOS led to better productivity, a worse
OR, and no significant change to ROA. These
results would suggest that the 2011 HOS will
potentially negatively impact productivity and
positively impact profitability.
HISTORY OF HOURS OF SERVICE
RULES
HOS were first proposed by the ICC in 1936 and
went into effect in July of 1938. These rules
allowed for 15 hours on-duty and 12 hours of
work per day, which could all be driving or
could also include other tasks such as loading,
unloading, and completing paperwork. Drivers
were also required to have at least 9 hours off
duty each day. A limit of 60 hours on-duty in 7
days or 70 hours on-duty in 8 days was also
instated. These rules resulted in protests from
both organized labor and some motor carriers, so
in early 1939 revised rules went into effect.
These new rules reduced the required off duty
time to 8 hours per day and implemented a 10
hour driving limit per day instead of the previous
12 hours of work per day. The next change came
in 1962 when, for unexplained reasons, the ICC
changed the rule to allow for a maximum driving
time of 10 hours and on duty time of 15 hours,
which could be extended to 16 hours with
breaks, after 8 hours off duty, so maximum on
duty and driving time per day became
maximums per work/rest cycle. This change
allowed drivers up to 16 hours of driving and
on-duty time per day (FMCSA, 2000). The 1962
hours of service regulations increased the
maximum driving time per day, but the retention
of the weekly limits kept maximum and average
weekly driving times the same. A driver could
simply reach his 8 day on-duty limit in 5 days
rather than 7 days, allowing for greater
flexibility in scheduling.
The HOS remained virtually unchanged until
2003. With the ICC Termination Act of 1995,
jurisdiction for HOS was given to the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA). The FHWA

was asked by Congress to re-examine HOS with
a focus on public safety and driver health. An
advanced notice of proposed rulemaking was
issued in 1996, but no further action was taken.
In 2000 jurisdiction was transferred to the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) and a notice of proposed rulemaking
was issued. In 2003 the FMCSA issued a final
rule, which went into effect in January 2004.
The 2003 HOS decreased maximum on-duty
time to 14 hours (including any breaks),
increased maximum driving time to 11 hours per
work/rest cycle, and increased off duty time to
10 hours. Furthermore, the 34 hour restart was
added, which allows a driver to reset the 7 or 8
day time limit effectively adding up to 14 hours
to a driver’s work week (Jones, 2007). The 2003
HOS led to a period of unrest and uncertainty
about the future of hours of service regulations
in the U.S.
The first lawsuit following the 2003 HOS was
filed by the consumer advocacy group, Public
Citizen, before the rule even went into effect,
and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit struck down the rule in 2004 citing the
fact that the FMCSA failed to take into account
driver health, as required by law, when setting
the 2003 HOS. Following that court ruling,
Congress granted temporary relief from the
ruling, and President Bush signed the Surface
Transportation Extension Act of 2004, giving
FMCSA a year to come up with a rule
addressing the court’s issues with the 11 hour
driving limit and 34 hour restart. In January
2005 FMCSA issued a notice of proposed rules
that make few changes to the 2003 HOS other
than changes to the split sleeper berth
provisions. This was subsequently published as
a final rule in August 2005 and went into effect
in October 2005. In 2006 Public Citizen once
more filed suit in federal court arguing for
different changes in the HOS, which resulted in

a federal appeals court vacating two provisions
of the rule in July 2007. At the request of the
American Trucking Association, the court issued
a 90 day stay to its mandate in September 2007.
The FMCSA then issued an interim final rule in
December 2007 identical to the 2005 rule, and
this was subsequently issued as a final rule in
November 2008. Public Citizen once more filed
suit in March 2009, and a settlement was
reached before the suit went to court. Therefore,
despite multiple lawsuits resulting in the 2003
HOS being struck down, the 2003 HOS have
remained virtually unchanged. The only change
came in 2005 and mandated that 8 of the 10
hours off duty for drivers operating with a
sleeper berth be taken consecutively (Jones,
2007; Munroe, 2009; Public Citizen, 2012).
As part of a settlement between FMCSA, the
Teamsters Union, Public Citizen and several
safety groups, FMCSA agreed to revise the HOS
taking into account drivers’ health and safety.
The proposed 2011 HOS were released in
December 2010, and the final rule was released
in December 2011. The compliance date for the
on-duty time and egregious violation definitions
and oil field exemption3 was February 27, 2012,
and all other provisions had a compliance date of
July 1, 2013. These new rules maintain a
maximum 11 hours of driving time but require a
30 minute break after 8 hours of driving. The
maximum on-duty time remains at 14 hours but
is effectively reduced to 13.5 with the required
break, unless the break is incorporated with the
split sleeper berth provision. Limitations to the
34 hour restart will require that it include two
periods between 1:00 am and 5:00 am and can
only be used once every 7 days or 168 hours.
Finally, the definition of on-duty time has been
modified to not include any time resting in a
parked vehicle (this could include detention
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time) or up to two hours in a passenger seat of a
moving vehicle following 8 hours in the sleeper
berth (FMCSA, 2011). Following the
publication of the final 2011 HOS, the American
Trucking Association filed a petition with a
federal court asking the court to review the 2011
HOS in February 2012 and filed an issue
statement in March 2012. The primary issues
identified are with the limitation to the 34 hour
restart and the inclusion of a mandatory 30
minute break following 8 hours on-duty
(McNally, 2012a; McNally, 2012b).
To help clarify the differences between the
different HOS that have been in place over the
last 74 years, Table 1 summarizes the HOS from
1938 – 2011. This table identifies the maximum
driving and on duty time per sleep/work cycle
and the potential maximum driving and on-duty
time per 24 hour period. In addition the
maximum driving and on-duty time possible in a
single week as well as the potential maximum
average driving and on-duty time is included in
Table 1. These figures are based on a driver
either driving the maximum allowable time,
taking the minimum off duty time, and resuming
driving or being on-duty the maximum
allowable time, taking the minimum off duty
time, and resuming driving. As shown in Table
1, the 2003 HOS reduced both the potential
drive time and on-duty time per day but
significantly increased the potential drive time or
on-duty time per week with the introduction of
the 34-hour restart, and the 2011 HOS reduced
these weekly times to a point approximately
midway between those allowed under the 1962
HOS and the 2003 HOS with the new limitations
on the 34-hour restart. McCartt et al. (2008)
report that approximately 80 per cent of drivers
were using the restart provision as part of their
regular schedule in 2004 and 2005, so the new
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limitations to this provision could have
significant impact throughout the trucking
industry.
ECONOMETRIC MODEL
For this study, three separate models were
developed to address the impact of the 2003
HOS on motor carrier profitability as measured
by operating ratio (OR), return on assets (ROA),
and return on equity (ROE). A fourth model was
developed to look at the impact on productivity
as measured by sales per employee (SPE). All
four models used the same independent
variables. The variable of interest, PHOS, is a
dummy variable indicating whether an
observation was taken after the 2003 HOS,
which went into effect in January of 2004. The
impact of this regulation is difficult to predict in
advance because, depending on the practices of a
particular firm, the maximum driving time per
day would have either been increased by 1 hour
(maximum time per duty cycle) or decreased by
2 hours (maximum time per day) and on-duty
time was decreased by 1 hour (maximum time
per duty cycle) or 2 hours (maximum time per
day). In addition to the HOS that went into
effect in 2004, two other types of regulations,
Ultra Low Sulfur Diesel (ULSD) requirements
and stricter emissions standards, likely had
impacts on motor carrier revenues and
profitability and went into effect between 2004
and 2010.
ULSD was phased in between 2006 and 2010
with all 2007 and newer vehicles required to
only run on ULSD. This change had an impact
on the price of diesel and on the price of tractors
which had to be modified in order to run with
the lower lubricity of ULSD. To incorporate
additional operating cost from this change into

TABLE 1:
SUMMARY OF HOS RULES

HOS

Drive
Time
per
Cycle

Drive On-Duty
Time Window
per
per
Day
Cycle

OnDuty
Time
per
Day

OffDuty
Time
per
Cycle

Max.
Wkly.
Drive
Time

Max.
Avg.
Wkly.
Drive
Time

Max.
Wkly.
OnDuty
Time

Max.
Avg.
Wkly.
OnDuty
Time

7(8)
Day
Limit

34-hour
Restart

1938
12
12
12
12
9
70
61.25 70
61.25 60 (70) No
1939
10
10
16
16
8
70
61.25 70
61.25 60 (70) No
16
15
16
8
70
61.25 70
61.25 60 (70) No
19621 10
20032 11
14
14
14
10
77
73.92 84
81.67 60 (70) Yes
20113 11
14
14
14
10
77
66
84
70
60 (70) Limited
1
Before the addition of the 34 hour restart the maximum time a driver could work was 60 hours in 7 days or 70 hours in
8 days (for a carrier operating 7 days per week). However, it was allowable to accumulate all 70 hours within 7 days or
less and take time off duty for the remainder of the 8 days. However, the maximum average work hours per week was
restricted by the 8 day driving limit to 61.25.2 With the addition of the 34 hour restart in 2003, it would be allowable for
a driver to accumulate 66 hours of driving time in 5 days, take a 34 hour break, and accumulate an additional 11 hours
of driving time before week’s end for a total of 77 hours in 7 days (assuming no other on-duty time). Furthermore, the
maximum average long run average driving hours per week was 73.92 hours. A driver with 14 hours of on-duty time
every cycle could accumulate up to 84 hours of on-duty time in a single week (66 hours of driving time) with a
maximum average weekly on-duty time of 81.67 hours.3 With the limitations to the 34 hour restart in 2011, a driver
would be able to maximize daily drive time by incorporating the mandatory 30 minute break into the 2 hour portion of
their split sleeper berth time. In a single day a driver could drive 8 hours, take two hours off duty, drive 3 hours, take 8
hours off duty in the sleeper berth, and drive an additional 3 hours (a driver not using the split sleeper berth provision
could drive a maximum of 13.5 hours in a single day). Continuing the pattern of drive 8, rest 2, drive 3, rest 8 through
66 hours of driving time, using the 34 hour reset and continuing the pattern again would allow for a maximum of 77
hours of driving time in a single week, but would be required to take additional time off the following week for an
average of 66 hours of driving time per week. A driver using 14 hours of on-duty time every cycle and a similar strategy
could work a maximum of 84 hours in a single week but would be limited to 56 hours the following week for an average
of 70 hours on-duty time per week. These maximum weekly and average weekly driving and on-duty times would be
the same for a driver not using the split sleeper berth provision and would generally include a longer week followed by a
shorter week.

the model, the percentage change in average
diesel price from the previous quarter or change
in diesel price (CDP) was used as an
independent variable. The average diesel price
may not be the same for all carriers, but the
percent increase or decrease should be similar
for all carriers operating in all different parts of
the country. Additionally the average diesel
price exhibited a high level of autocorrelation.
Stricter emissions standards were implemented
for 2004 and newer vehicles, and then even
stricter emissions standards were implemented

for 2007 and newer vehicles and phased in
through 2010. Due to the language of the law,
there were modest increases in new vehicle
prices in 2004 and 2007 followed by large
increases in 2010. To incorporate this
information into the model, the average percent
change in new tractor price (CTP) was included
as an independent variable. While it would be
preferable to obtain the actual price per tractor
from each carrier, that information was
unavailable, however, tractors are sold in a
competitive environment, so the average price
increase or decrease should be correlated with
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each individual carrier’s cost of equipment. As
with average diesel price, average tractor price
exhibited a high level of autocorrelation, so
percentage change was used in the model.
To control for general economic conditions, the
percentage change in Gross Domestic Product
(GDPD) for the services sector was included in
the model as well as a dummy variable for any
quarter that had a month classified as recession
(REC). To control for the different business
environments less-than-truckload (LTL) and
truckload carriers operate in and the different
business environments between unionized and
non-unionized carriers, dummy variables were

included for LTL and unionized carriers (UC).
Finally, dummy variables were included for the
four quarters of the year. Manufacturing
shipments were considered as an independent
variable, but that measure was highly correlated
with the quarter of the year (Q1-Q4), and a better
fit to the data was obtained by using the
quarterly dummy variables. Firm specific
dummy variables were not included in the
models as indicated by a Hausman Test for
random effects.
Putting these variables together resulted in the
following four equations to be estimated:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)
MODEL DATA
For this analysis, quarterly data for 14 out of 17
publicly traded motor carriers with data
available from 1997-2010 was used, resulting in
56 observations per carrier and a total of 784
observations. The years 1997-2010 were
chosen, so there would be an even number of
observations on each side of the 2003 HOS.
Landstar was excluded because it is a non-asset
based carrier, and therefore, operates in a
somewhat different business environment. UPS
Freight and FedEx Freight were also excluded
because their SEC filings don’t separate out the
LTL portion of their business from the express,
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small package, and other portions of their
business. Furthermore, YRC Worldwide was
excluded from the estimation of Equation 3 due
to the company’s negative equity in Q2-Q3 2009
and Q1-Q4 2010. Table 2 lists the 14 carriers
included in the sample as well as whether they
were LTL carriers or unionized (UC). For
purposes of the analysis, any carrier with a
significant portion of their business coming from
LTL business was considered LTL because they
would have made the significant capital
investment in terminals required of LTL carriers.

TABLE 2:
CARRIERS INCLUDED IN SAMPLE
Company Name
Arkansas Best Corporation
Celadon Group, Inc.
Con-way, Inc.
Covenant Transportation Group, Inc.
Frozen Food Express Industries, Inc.
Heartland Express, Inc.
J B Hunt, LLC.
Knight Transportation, Inc.
Marten Transport, LTD.
Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc.
PAM Transportation Systems, Inc.
USA Truck, Inc.
Werner Enterprises, Inc.
YRC Worldwide, Inc.*
*

LTL
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
N
N
N
Y
N
N
N
Y

Union
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y

Not included in Equation 3 due to negative equity in 6 quarters of the sample period.

The financial data for the carriers (total sales,
cost of goods sold, total assets, total equity, and
number of employees) came from Standard and
Poor’s Compustat North America. From this
data, operating ratio (OR), return on assets
(ROA), return on equity (ROE), and sales per
employee per quarter in thousands of dollars
(SPE) were calculated. The average tractor price
was obtained from Paccar Truck’s SEC filings,
in which they list the revenue from truck sales
and units sold. The average tractor price was
calculated from this and then adjusted for
inflation using the Producer Price Index (PPI)
for heavy trucks obtained from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (BLS) (2012). Average diesel
price was obtained from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration (EIA) (2012), and it
was also adjusted for inflation using the PPI, and
the CDP was then calculated. GDPD was
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) (2012). Data on recessions was obtained
from the National Bureau of Economic Research

(NBER) (2012). Table 3 lists the variables used
in the analysis as well as some descriptive
statistics. Dummy variables are included to
show what percentage of time or carriers fall
into which categories.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The final four models were estimated using
SHAZAM econometric software with the POOL
command. This is a generalized least squares
(GLS) estimator that assumes and corrects for
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within
cross sections, different values of rho for each
cross section, and correlation between error
terms from different cross sections. Initial
testing performed by SHAZAM (Whistler et al.,
20011) indicated that these assumptions were
justified.
The results of the analysis are summarized in
Table 4. The first R2 reported in Table 4 is based
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TABLE 3:
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF VARIABLES
Variable
OR
ROA
ROE
SPE
CTP
CDP
CGDP
PHOS
LTL
UC
REC
Sources:

Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
86.31
7.31
65.24
4.44
7.80
-69.32
9.64
16.15
-134.77
29.89
7.21
11.82
0.13
2.85
-7.30
1.43
9.48
-32.24
2.34
1.77
-2.30
0.50
0.50
0.00
0.36
0.48
0.00
0.14
0.35
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.00
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012
Paccar, Inc., 1997-2012
Standard and Poor’s Compustat North America, 2011
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012
U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2012

on the residuals from the Best Linear Unbiased
Predictor (BLUP), which uses the coefficients on
the untransformed variables to predict but then
adjusts that prediction using the residual from
the previous period multiplied by rho for the
particular firm in question. The second R2
reported is based on a method described by Buse
(1973) as an appropriate R2 to use for GLS
estimation. These goodness of fit measures
show that Equations 1 and 3 were most effective
for prediction and Equation 2 explained little of
the variance in return on equity.
The most interesting result of Equation 1 was
that the operating ratio for the firms in question
actually worsened after the 2003 HOS,
indicating that despite the fact that drivers could
accumulate more driving or on-duty hours in a
day or week, many of the carriers were not able
to decrease their expenses relative to revenue.
This appears to be the case even after accounting
for tractor and diesel prices, economic growth,
and recessions. The other results of Equation 1
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Max
119.44
18.24
63.31
56.50
12.44
24.00
6.20
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00

were much as expected: an increase in
equipment or fuel prices leads to a worse OR, an
increase in GDP leads to a better OR, a recession
leads to a worse OR, and LTL carriers and
unionized carriers experience higher costs than
TL or non-unionized carriers.
The estimated coefficients of Equation 2 and
Equation 3 reveal that the 2003 HOS changes,
tractor prices, and diesel prices have no
significant impact on ROA or ROE; however,
the signs of the estimated coefficients are
negative, consistent with the results of Equation
1. It seems that any increased expenses or
decreased revenue contributing to the higher OR
are able to be accounted for by reducing assets
and equity or exploiting some source of profit
other than from operations. Furthermore,
Equation 2 shows that LTL carriers may be able
to actually achieve a slightly higher ROA than
TL carriers (the sign is positive but only
significant at the 0.10 level), and unionized
carriers tend to have a lower ROA than non-

TABLE 4:
RESULTS OF ESTIMATION
Estimated Coefficient (p-value)
Independent
Variable

Equation1
(OR)

Equation 2
(ROA)

Equation 3
(ROE)

Equation 4
(SPE)

PHOS

0.807
(0.03)

-0.806
(0.25)

-1.783
(0.14)

2.770
(0.00)

CTP

0.043
(0.03)

-0.024
(0.63)

-0.038
(0.72)

0.046
(0.14)

CDP

0.024
(0.00)

-0.004
(0.81)

0.025
(0.48)

0.059
(0.00)

CGDP

-0.208
(0.01)

0.418
(0.02)

0.789
(0.02)

-0.024
(0.84)

REC

0.807
(0.00)

-1.682
(0.01)

-2.832
(0.03)

0.724
(0.09)

LTL

2.828
(0.01)

1.320
(0.09)

-0.450
(0.83)

4.106
(0.01)

UC

7.153
(0.00)

-3.403
(0.02)

1.353
(0.69)

4.849
(0.00)

Q1

85.149
(0.00)

2.972
(0.00)

5.094
(0.00)

25.198
(0.00)

Q2

83.562
(0.00)

5.236
(0.00)

9.447
(0.00)

26.896
(0.00)

Q3

83.635
(0.00)

4.416
(0.00)

8.911
(0.00)

27.501
(0.00)

Q4

83.938
(0.00)

3.797
(0.00)

7.172
(0.00)

27.334
(0.00)

0.896
0.312

0.417
0.113

0.314
0.108

0.863
0.228

R2

BLUP
R2
BUSE
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unionized carriers. Equation 3, on the other
hand, shows no significant difference in ROE
between LTL and TL carriers or between
unionized and non-unionized carriers, but this
result is likely due to the fact that the largest LTL
and unionized carrier was excluded from the
sample. Other hypotheses confirmed by
Equation 2 and Equation 3 are that a growing
economy allows for higher ROA and ROE and a
recession is associated with a lower ROA and
ROE.
Rather than financial performance, Equation 4
deals with productivity, and the results are much
as expected because longer driving times per day
and week should lead to the same work being
accomplished with fewer employees. Sales per
employee increased after the 2003 HOS
regulatory change. Tractor price increases have
no significant impact on SPE. Diesel price
increases have a slight impact on SPE likely due
to the increase in revenues from higher fuel
surcharges. GDP changes seem to have no
impact on productivity, but it may be slightly
higher during a recession (significant at the 0.10
level). Finally, LTL and unionized carriers tend
to have higher sales per employee, most likely
because of the higher prices charged to
customers. These higher prices are apparently
not enough to cover the additional expenses
from higher capital expenses for LTL carriers
and higher wages for unionized carriers because
Equation 1 reveals a higher OR for LTL than for
TL carriers and a higher OR for unionized
carriers than for non-unionized carriers.
CONCLUSIONS
The results of this study indicate that despite
motor carriers being able to increase their sales
per employee after the 2003 HOS, they were
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unable to improve or even maintain their
operating ratios. However, they were able to
maintain, but not increase, profitability as
measured by ROA and ROE, possibly due to a
reduced need for capital investments in tractors
and terminals resulting from this increased
productivity. Whatever the reason for this lack
of impact to ROA and ROE, it shows that
publicly traded motor carriers are flexible
enough to maintain these measures of
profitability despite changes to federal
regulations.
The applicability of these results to the impact
on carriers from the 2011 HOS is somewhat
unclear, but one would expect to see somewhat
of a reversal due to the newly added restrictions
to the 34-hour restart provision. This is based on
a survey by McCartt et al. (2008), in which
drivers were interviewed at weigh stations in
Pennsylvania and Oregon in 2004 and again in
2005. The results of the survey indicate that
approximately 80 per cent of drivers drove fewer
or about the same hours per day in 2004 and
2005 as before the 2003 HOS went into effect,
but approximately 80 per cent of drivers use the
restart provision as part of their regular
schedules. This indicates that driving hours per
day were minimally impacted by the changes,
but driving hours per week likely increased
(necessitating the use of the restart provision). If
this is the case, the restriction of the restart
provision implemented in the 2011 HOS will
likely decrease the hours driven per week.
Therefore, assuming the same patterns hold, the
implementation of the 2011 HOS in 2013 will
likely result in both an improved OR and
decreased SPE for motor carriers, and one would
expect to see minimal impact to ROA and ROE.

The results of this study indicate that motor
carriers should not be overly concerned about a
loss of profitability resulting from any
forthcoming reductions in maximum driving
hours per day. While this will not happen in the
immediate future, it could still be an issue
despite the final 2011 HOS including no
reduction to maximum driving time. The final
rule states that if new research comes out
showing improved health of drivers or safety of
the general public from a reduction in maximum
driving time, the rule could be modified
(FMCSA, 2011). If this does occur, carriers
could expect to see minimal changes to
productivity and operating ratio and should be
able to maintain their ROA and ROE if the same
pattern is followed. The results also indicate
that carriers could expect to see minimal
changes to ROA or ROE from the 2011 HOS as
written and a decrease to both operating ratio
and sales per employee. However, it remains to
be decided in court whether the 2011 HOS will
stand as written or be revised yet again.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The most obvious limitation of this research lies
in the sample size and selection. Rather than
taking a representative sample of carriers, a
convenience sample of publicly traded carriers
were used. In the case of the motor carrier
industry the publicly traded carriers are also
some of the largest, but they are also a rather
small group. This limitation leads to the most
obvious extension for future research: to
conduct the same analysis using a larger, more
representative sample. Of course, future
research based on a larger sample would need to
be based on case study or survey data due to the
fact that financial statements are not publicly
available for most motor carriers.

Further limitations of the study were the use of
industry averages for the price of equipment and
the price of fuel due to a lack of availability of
firm specific values for these measures. Using
case study or survey data for future research on
this matter should alleviate this problem. Finally
this study used sales per employee as a measure
of productivity rather than sales per driver or
sales per driver hour. While these measures may
be highly correlated for many carriers, there is
no way to know for sure without both variables.
So the most significant limitations of this
research lie in sample size and selection and
variables used. All of these issues stem from
data availability and could be alleviated by
conducting further research using case study
and/or survey data to get more specific variables
and a larger, more representative sample.

ENDNOTES
One work/rest cycle would include the time from when a
driver comes on duty until he is able to come on duty
again. For a driver, driving as many hours as possible
under the 2003 HOS, this is between 21 and 24 hours with
up to 11 hours of driving, up to 14 hours on duty, and at
least 10 hours of sleep.
1

A driver working every day is allowed a maximum of 70
hours on duty time in 8 days (192 hours), but taking 34
hours off duty allows a driver to reset the clock as if he
had not worked at all in the last 192 hours.
2

The definition of “on duty time” was adjusted to not
include time spent resting in a parked vehicle after being
released from duty, “egregious” HOS violations were
specifically defined as driving 3 or more hours beyond the
driving time limit and subject to maximum civil penalties,
and logging requirements for certain drivers at oil fields
were clarified.
3
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ABSTRACT
In the wake of the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) of 1990, paratransit services were offered to
improve mobility, employment opportunities, and access to community services for individuals who
are mentally or physically handicapped. Due to the complexity involved in ADA rules and
transportation regulations as well as the customized, on-demand service requirements, paratransit
services are far more costly to render than fixed-route based mass transit services. In times of
ongoing budget crisis among public entities, many public transit authorities cope with a dilemma of
meeting the growing demand and complex service requirements, while controlling rising paratransit
costs. Considering this dilemma, this paper proposes a decision support system (DSS) that can aid
the mass transit authority in evaluating paratransit service performance, while continually improving
performance over time. To validate the usefulness of the proposed DSS, it has been applied to the
actual case of the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA).
INTRODUCTION
Paratransit is the transportation service that
supplements larger public transportation systems
by providing individualized rides without fixed
routes or timetables. In 1990, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed which
allowed passengers who cannot use regular
public transportation services due to their
physical, cognitive, or mental disability to use
alternative paratransit services complementary to
the fixed route services already in place. Such
paratransit was not mandated by law until 1990,
but has been provided to individuals in a similar
form in the greater Boston metropolitan area
since 1977.
The U.S. Department of Transportation
(USDOT) regulations, which implement the
transportation provisions of the ADA, require

that public transit agencies which provide fixed
route service also provide “complementary
paratransit service” to persons with disabilities
who are unable to use the fixed route system.
The level of service provided by the paratransit
program must be “comparable” to that provided
by the fixed route service. Such comparability is
determined by six service criteria: (1) Service
area; (2) Response time; (3) Fares; (4) Days and
hours of operations; (5) Trip purposes served
and; (6) Capacity constraints.
Section 12143 of the ADA rules and regulations
state that if an entity operates a fixed route
system (other than a system which provides
solely commuter bus service) but fails to provide
paratransit and other special transportation
services to these individuals, it is considered to
be discriminatory against individuals with
disabilities. This includes individuals who use
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wheelchairs. These individuals should be
allowed to use a level of service (1) which is
comparable to the level of designated public
transportation services provided to individuals
without disabilities using such system; or (2) in
the case of response time, which is comparable,
to the extent practicable, to the level of
designated public transportation services
provided to individuals without disabilities using
such system. The requirement is that any entity
such as the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority
(MBTA) running a fixed route system must
provide a comparable service area of ½ mile
surrounding each of the fixed rail or bus routes.
Fares, days and hours, trip purposes (i.e. going
to work, going to medical appointment, going
shopping, etc.), and capacity constraints are
required to be comparable to that of a fixed route
service.
The paratransit service required by the ADA
states that prices to its customers must be
comparable to that of the public transit already
in existence. Since the public transit fare is
usually quite low, the state and municipal
governments that typically finance the public
transit system need to deal with the dilemma of
absorbing the mounting cost of paratransit. The
rising cost of paratransit is due to many factors.
These include vehicle purchases, maintenance
and repairs, insurance, fuel, driver wages,
administration, overhead and incentive programs
for contractors. As demand rises with the
increase of elderly persons from the Baby
Boomer era, there is a need for more affordable
paratransit service. Since the revenue from the
riders’ fares only covers a small portion of the
cost of running paratransit services, there is a
growing concern that quality of service will be
compromised. For example, fares covered less
than 4% of the MTA New York City Transit’s
operating expenses (Lowenstein, 2006). The
rising costs are directly associated with the
increased demand, because more vehicles and
drivers are needed to cover the increased
demand. Rising fuel costs are also a cause for
concern given crude oil prices in the range of
$100 a barrel.
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In addition, paratransit regulation often
mandates the establishment of specific operating
policies with respect to: (1) The level of
assistance provided; (2) Employee training; (3)
Secure systems; (4) Accommodation of service
animals and life support equipment and; (5) Noshow policies. Lastly, rules and regulations
require that public entities providing
complementary paratransit have a process for
determining eligibility for ADA Paratrasit and
who qualifies to use the paratransit service.
There are two types of paratransit services
required by ADA: (1) door-to-door service and;
(2) curb-to-curb service. Door-to-door service is
the service in which the driver will assist the
rider from their door to the vehicle at their
pickup location and will assist the rider from the
vehicle to the door of their destination, while
curb-to-curb service is similar to a taxi service
where the driver will wait in the vehicle for the
rider to embark the vehicle and drop them off at
the rider’s destination without any assistance.
Since door-to-door service takes more time and
additional driver’s efforts, such services may be
curtailed in time of budget crisis.
There are many studies that have been
performed to evaluate the efficiency of
paratransit systems worldwide. These include
peer to peer analyses as well as historical data
analyses. Some studies (Lave and Rosemary,
2000; Min, 2011) recognized the increased need
for paratransit service as well as improvements
that will need to be made in order to meet the
demand of paratransit passengers. Other studies
such as Fu, Yang and Cosello (2007) and Min
and Lambert (2010) evaluated the comparative
performance of individual paratransit systems to
identify “best practice” (most efficient) agencies
and the sources of their efficiency. Thus, upon
identifying the most efficient systems along with
the influencing factors, new service policies,
management and operational strategies may need
to be developed for improved resource
utilization and better quality of service (Fu, Yang
and Cosello, 2007). In a similar manner, there

have been studies on the development of
methodologies to estimate confidence intervals
of certain analyses of efficiency of individual
urban paratransit agencies and the statistical
significance of trends in individual agency
efficiency (Barnum, Gleason and Brendon,
2007). The studies discussed above were taken
into consideration in deciding what analysis
would be appropriate for the historical data
provided by the MBTA’s THE RIDE Paratransit
system in the Greater Boston area.
MBTA’s THE RIDE
The Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority’s
(MBTA) THE RIDE is the paratransit system in
place in the Greater Boston Metropolitan area in
Massachusetts. THE RIDE program is an
advanced notice, shared-ride, door-to-door
paratransit program for persons with disabilities
adhering to the ADA’s rules and regulations.
This paratransit service has been running since
1970, twenty years before the requirement of
such service. This gives THE RIDE a bit of an
advantage because of the experience it has in
running such a service.
THE RIDE program currently operates under
Federal ADA regulations, providing service to
over 60 cities and towns covering 688 square
miles, 7 days a week, generally from 6 a.m. to 1
a.m., including holidays. THE RIDE costs each
passenger $2.00 per one way trip. THE RIDE
program is managed by the MBTA’s Office of
Transportation Access (OTA) comprised of
seventeen (17) staff members. The staff in OTA
administers and manages all aspects of THE
RIDE program. Their responsibilities include
setting service policies and standards,
contracting and overseeing contracted service
providers, rider eligibility certification, and
customer service (handling and investigating
rider complaints), and posting fare deposits to
customer’s RIDE accounts. The Office also
purchases and leases many of the 635 liftequipped vans/sedans used by the three
contracted service providers: (1) Greater Lynn

Senior Services; (2) Veterans Transportation
Services; and (3) the Joint Venture. THE RIDE
uses these three contractors to meet its
obligations to provide paratransit service. All
contractors were required to bid on the service
contract to best exemplify the type of customer
service, pricing, and other systems in place to
meet and exceed the ADA requirements. The
map below depicts the service area for each
contractor with different shadescolors. Greater
Lynn Senior Services is responsible for the area
in blue to the North of Boston, Veterans
Transportation Services (VTS) is responsible for
the area in red to the Northwest of Boston, and
Joint Venture is responsible for the area in green
to the south of Boston. All contractors are
responsible for Boston, in yellow on the map.
The cities and towns covered by the MBTA’s
THE RIDE in the four service areas are as
follows (see Figure 1). (1) North of Boston:
Beverly, Chelsea, Danvers, Everett, Lynn,
Lynnfield, Malden, Marblehead, Melrose,
Middleton, Nahant, Peabody, Reading, Revere,
Salem, Saugus, Stoneham, Swampscott,
Topsfield, Wakefield, Wenham, and Winthrop.
(2) Northwest of Boston: Arlington, Bedford,
Belmont, Brookline, Burlington, Cambridge,
Concord, Lexington, Lincoln, Medford, Newton,
Somerville, Waltham, Watertown, Weston,
Wilmington, Winchester and Woburn. (3) South
of Boston: Braintree, Canton, Cohasset,
Dedham, Dover, Hingham, Holbrook, Hull,
Medfield, Milton, Needham, Norwood, Quincy,
Randolph, Sharon, Walpole, Westwood, and
Weymouth. (4) Boston which includes Allston,
Back Bay, Brighton, Charlestown, Chinatown,
Dorchester, Downtown Boston, East Boston,
Fenway, Hyde Park, Jamaica Plain, Mattapan,
North End, Roslindale, Roxbury, South Boston,
South End and Roxbury.
In addition to providing Paratransit service to the
aforementioned more than 60 towns and
communities, THE RIDE also has cooperative
agreements with the Brockton Area Transit and
with the MetroWest Regional Transit Authority
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FIGURE 1
THE RIDE SERVICE AREA
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to provide THE RIDE service to and from the
main transit terminal in Brockton and the
Wellesley Farms Commuter Rail Station. This
also allows Brockton Area Transit and
MetroWest Regional Transit Authority area
residents to use their respective Paratransit
service and then transfer to MBTA THE RIDE
vehicles to travel to and from points in THE
RIDE service area. In some instances of travel,
transfers may be required. That is, a rider may
be going from one area serviced by one
contractor to another area serviced by another
contractor. This is also the case with the above
cooperative agreements. There are two transfer
sites within THE RIDE’s service area, they are:
(1) Ruggles and (2) Malden/Medford. In both
cases, transfers are necessary to provide more
efficient service. For example, if a rider requests
a trip from Salem to Concord, it is more efficient
to have a vehicle transfer in Malden/Medford so
that the vehicle coming from Salem operated by
the Greater Lynn Senior Services can pick up
another rider in the area that it services right
after the drop off rather than driving all the way
to Concord and then coming back into its service
area to pick up another rider. If there were no
transfers, there would be a lot of wasted time
and miles in between each trip in such a case.
The US Department of Transportation’s ADA
regulations require that all transit entities, that
provide complementary paratransit service, also
have a process for determining who is eligible
for ADA mandated paratransit services. In
summary, the specific criteria stated in this
regulation indicate that persons with disabilities
are eligible for ADA required paratransit
services if their disability:
Prevents them from traveling to or from
fixed route stops or stations;
Does not allow them to use a bus route or
rail station for a particular route or station;
Does not allow them to “navigate” the
systems without others’ assistance.
Not only is it a requirement to have an eligibility
determination process, but this process must also
meet several regulatory requirements. These
include the following:

Interim service must be provided if
determinations are not made within 21
calendar days of receipt of a completed
application.
A written notice must be given, once the
decision on eligibility has been made. This
notice includes the disclosure of specific
reasons for denial or limit. This notice
should also describe how the applicants can
appeal the decision.
An appeal process is required. Appellants
must be given the opportunity to be heard in
person and can have others provide
information on their behalf. There must be a
“separation of authority” between those
involved in the appeal process and those
involved in the initial determination. An
appeal must be accepted within at least 60
days after the notice of the initial decision.
That appeal must be decided within 30 days
of the appeal hearing.
All drivers receive sensitivity and safety training
so that they can respond in a responsible and
proper manner. Drivers provide assistance into
and out of vehicles and from and to the main
entrance or lobby area of the rider’s point of
origin and destination, respectively. Drivers also
assist individuals who use wheelchairs, at the
rider’s point of origin and destination, up a ramp
of over a maximum of one curb and/or one step
(several steps if a rider is ambulatory). In
addition to this assistance, the driver will help
the rider carry a manageable number of shopping
bags to the door step of a rider’s residence. This
door-to-door service is customer-centric as it
provides customized personal assistance. This
assistance, however, creates less efficiency than
a standard service. For example, the average
time it takes for a vehicle to leave a pick up or
drop off location is between 6 and 8 minutes.
This is valuable time that could be used driving
to the next pick up or drop-off location.
Each vehicle is equipped with Mobile Data
Computers (MDC’s) which contain a global
positioning system (GPS); it disables touch
screen while driving and has a radio for
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emergency situations. It also has Auto Vehicle
Locators (AVL’s) that provide more accurate routes
and data as well as lessen the radio time being
used by each driver. This equipment provides the
rider with a much more pleasant and safer trip. In
addition, the AVL’s provide the operators with real
time vehicle location which makes it easier for the
operators to alter a driver’s route without his/her
knowledge of a change. This control can be helpful
due to the real time knowledge of whereabouts of
the contractor’s vehicles at any given time. The
AVL can be further utilized in rerouting a vehicle
to accommodate last minute trips as well as
transferring a trip to a different vehicle which
otherwise would have been missed or caused the
contractor to have a late trip and therefore would
be penalized for that trip.
The routing system is able to provide trip
schedules based on a rider’s requests. Once at 4
p.m. on the day before a deadline passes, a
specialized routing program developed by
Strategen Inc. schedules the trips for each
contractor. There are a few common constraints by
which each contractor must comply. These
constraints include riding time, departure time, and
arrival time constraints. The departure time
requested by the rider must be met within 30
minutes of the requested time. The arrival time
must be within certain parameters set by each
individual contractor, but remains within the
parameters of the rider’s preferences. For
example, a rider may want to arrive at his or her
doctor’s appointment at 9:00 a.m. The parameter
is to arrive at the location by 9:00 am, but a
contractor may set up a parameter in the software
that requires the drop off at the location to be
fifteen minutes before the required time so that the
rider is not late for his/her appointment. The
riding time constraints ensure that for a trip that
takes less than 30 minutes to complete (direct
time), the rider will not be in the vehicle for more
than 60 minutes. If the trip takes more than 30
minutes to complete, the rider should not be in the
vehicle for more than twice the required time for
that trip.
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Other required information, which is generally
linked to a rider’s profile upon receiving
eligibility from THE RIDE, includes the needs
of equipment (e.g., wheelchairs, scooters, and
walkers) and service animals. Also, a rider
must specify if he or she has a Personal Care
Assistant (PCA) or a guest riding with him/
her. The PCA can ride free of charge. PCA’s
and the guest must travel at the same time as
the certified rider to and from the same
destination. This information is important for
the RIDE to ensure that a vehicle with
appropriate equipment is dispatched to each
pick up location, when routing vehicles with
different types of wheelchair accessibilities.
On the day of the trip, the rider must be ready
five minutes before his or her scheduled
pickup and must be prepared to wait up to
fifteen minutes after that time. The driver
must wait for the rider for five minutes from
the time of the scheduled pickup. If the rider
is not at the pickup location within five
minutes, the driver can obtain clearance from
his/her dispatcher to leave. A rider is
considered a NO SHOW if he or she fails to
cancel his/her trip within one hour of the
scheduled pickup or fails to show up within
five minutes after the scheduled pickup time.
If the driver does not arrive within fifteen
minutes after the scheduled pickup time, the
rider should call the Contractor for an
Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) or can
reschedule his/her pickup at that time. If a
driver is late 15 to 30 minutes, there is a 10%
penalty of that total value paid to the
Contractor for that trip. If a driver is late more
than 30 minutes, the trip is not paid to the
Contractor. These penalties force the
Contractors to honor promised times, use the
routing program, and make appropriate
adjustments throughout the day to ensure
timely pickups.
The phone system uses an Interactive Voice
Response (IVR) system to callback riders once
their trip has been scheduled with promised
times for each pick up for the next day in the

scheduling program discussed above. These call
backs occur the evening before the scheduled
trips after the routing schedule has been
produced by the software and prior to 9:00 p.m.
The IVR is a system that takes all of the
promised times from the schedule produced and
automatically calls the riders to confirm these
times. When the rider is on the phone, he/she
can confirm or cancel his/her trip automatically.
This provides a more streamlined system and in
essence lowers costs further as discussed below.
There are many cost elements associated with
the RIDE. These are mobilization costs,
administrative overhead expenditures, and
operational costs for each contractor.
Mobilization costs include administrative
personnel wages/fringes, rent, utilities,
telephone, supplies, furniture/equipment,
computer hardware, computer software, MDC/
AVL, IVR, general insurance, vehicle operating
expenses, communications system and profit.
Mobilization costs exclude any and all capital
expense. Administration and overhead
expenditures include all amortized and capital
expenses. Operational costs include driver
salaries/fringes, vehicle maintenance, vehicle
insurance, fees/licenses, and so forth. These
costs also include fuel cost which is reimbursed
to the Contractor for the actual price paid per
gallon up to the average price per day in the
Boston Metro Area, as listed via the AAA
website. The Contractor is responsible for
providing actual receipts for all gasoline
purchases for services rendered, specifying
whether receipts were for fuel purchases or for
Authority owned or Contractor owned vehicles,
adjusting the amount of reimbursement sought
each month to ensure nothing exceeds the AAA
recorded average per day and providing a
summary report each month by day and by
vehicle.
With all of these costs taken into consideration,
the average net cost per passenger one way trip
is $41.61 for fiscal year 2010 (July through
December 2009). As one can see, the fare of
$2.00 per each one way trip hardly covers the

actual net cost of the trip (mere 4.8% of the
operating cost). The fares that are not charged to
PCA’s even though a seat is taken are considered
a cost that is being paid with no revenue to offset
it. The aforementioned costs are also associated
with the service that is provided to each rider.
These services include meeting required pickup
and drop off times, and personalized assistance
provided by the drivers. The metrics of these
services are discussed above and will now be
summarized.
· The maximum allowable riding time is a
standard used by Veterans Transportation
Services to maintain the quality of
paratransit services and is defined using the
formula: The riding time may not exceed an
hour if the direct drive time required for the
trip is less than 30 minutes; else, the riding
time may not exceed twice the direct drive
time required if that time is greater than or
equal to 30 minutes.
· Pickup times must be within 15 minutes of
the promised time for the Contractor to avoid
penalties. These penalties are considered
savings to THE RIDE, but also incentives for
providing the best customer service.
· Assistance provided by the driver includes
carrying groceries to the door and assisting
the rider to and from the door of their drop
off and pickup locations, respectively. All of
the aforementioned services and service
parameters come at a cost to the Contractor,
THE RIDE, and ultimately, taxpayers.
DECISION SUPPORT FRAMEWORK
To deal with a constant dilemma of making a
trade-off between costs and rider service
requirements, a decision support system (DSS)
was developed. Its basic architecture is
graphically depicted in Figure 2. As Figure 2
shows, the implementation of DSS begins with
the development of data bases. Once necessary
data are fed into the model which will be used to
gauge the efficiency (both service and cost) of
current paratransit services, the model outcome
will be assessed to see if the current services are
of acceptable quality. If dissatisfied with the
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FIGURE 2
BASIC ARCHITECTURE OF THE DECISION SUPPORT SYSEM
FOR THE RIDE
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paratransit service performance, the current
paratransit route structures and schedules have to
be changed while considering adjusting required
resources (adding drivers, working overtime, and
leasing/purchasing more vehicles under budget
constraints). The impact of such changes on
service quality and overall costs will be
evaluated based on the summary of the outcomes
in visual forms such as graphs and tables.
To demonstrate the usefulness of the
aforementioned DSS framework, we first
collected the actual data and then analyzed such
data using statistical tools. The goal was to
compare the quality of paratransit services to the
public transit services. Paratransit ride data were
provided by the Veterans Transportation Services
contractor in two separate reports, both in Excel
2007 (.xlsx) format; (1) “Veterans – The Ride
Manifest By Stop” printed 05/05/2010 at 18:30
and; (2) “MBTA Daily Posted Routes for 05/06/
2010.” The Manifest By Stop contained all the
planned trips for May 6, 2010 and the Daily
Posted Routes contained all actual executed
routes for May 6, 2010.
The first report provided, “Veterans – The Ride,
Manifest By Stop,” included specific
information on the Registered Passenger ID,
Passenger Name, Requested Pickup and Dropoff Locations, Ambulatory information (i.e.
whether a rider is able to walk or not),
Wheelchair information, Equipment needs,
Service needs, Additional Descriptions, and
Directions and Notes. The ambulatory
information is provided by a binary code. On
the report it reads Amb: and then either a 0 or 1.
If Amb: 0, then the rider is unable to walk; if
Amb: 1, then the rider is able to walk. For
noting whether or not a rider needs a wheelchair,
it is similarly noted: WC: 0, if a wheelchair is
not needed and WC: 1, if a wheelchair is needed.
The next section is Equipment Needs which is
denoted by the following and defined in
parenthesis: A (Braces), C (Cane), R (Crutches),
X (Extra Space), O (Oxygen), P (Power Chair),
T (Prosthetics), S (Scooter), K (Walker), W
(Wheelchair), TP (TTY Phone), TW (TTY

Work), I (Infant Car Seat), and B (Child Booster
Seat). The Service Needs section was not
utilized in this report. Additional Descriptions
provided a section where the name of the actual
location was typically given, i.e. the name of the
hospital or rehabilitation center. Directions and
Notes gave the driver additional information on
how the rider may have wanted to travel go, if
the rider needed assistance to and from the door,
what floor the doctor’s office is on, etc. In
general, the additional information provided to
the driver is to help better serve the riders to and
from their requested locations.
The second report provided, “MBTA Daily
Posted Routes for 05/06/2010,” included
information such as the Registered Passenger ID,
a unique identifier for each rider; the Trip ID,
unique identifier for each trip; the Same Day
Scheduling information denoted by “Yes” or
“No;” the Passenger Name, Trip Disposition
denoted by OK, Late16, Late30, No-Show, and
Canceled. OK means that the driver arrived on
time and the rider was picked up. Late16 means
that the driver arrived more than 15 minutes later
than the Promised Time, but not more than 30
minutes late to pick up the rider. Late30 means
the driver arrived more than 30 minutes after the
Promised Time, but still picked up the rider. NoShow means that the rider was not there within
five minutes upon the driver’s arrival or failed to
cancel the scheduled trip with at least one hour’s
notice. If the driver arrives at the No-Show
pickup location, the driver waited for the rider
for five or more minutes and then acquired the
clearance to leave. Canceled means that the trip
was properly canceled and usually the driver is
not even dispatched to that rider’s pickup
location. Other information included in this
report is Required Time, the time the rider
requested to be picked up or the time at which it
is necessary to be picked up to arrive at
requested destination at a certain time; the
Promised Time, the time the contractor has
confirmed to pick up the rider; the Pickup Arrive
Time and Pickup Leave Time are the times the
driver arrived to pick up the rider and the time
the driver left with the rider on board; the Drop
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off Arrive Time and Drop off Leave Time are the
times when the driver arrived at the location to
drop off the rider and the time the driver left that
location without the rider on board; the Pickup
address and city, the Drop off address and city,
Personal Care Assistant (PCA) information,
Vehicle ID and Driver ID.
With the aforementioned information, the
reports can be compared to one another to get a
sense of how many changes in trips and routes
are made after 6:30 p.m., i.e., cutoff time on the
previous day. From the extent of changes being
made, one can see how complicated it may
become to rearrange routes and how necessary it
is to have a reliable program to route the trips as
well as an experienced staff to manually reroute
vehicles according to the changes throughout the
day. The changes a rider can make to his or her
reservation include, but are not limited to time
changes, pickup and drop off locations changes,
cancellations, and no-showing for one’s ride.
Changes made to the routes throughout the day
manually are caused by weather, traffic, road
construction, and delays at pickup and drop off
locations.
The Daily Posted Routes for 05/06/2010
contained data for all rides executed by Veterans
Transportation Services on May 6, 2010. Each
trip is a one way trip from an origin to a
destination. There were a total of 2,376
completed rides for this day, comprised of 2204
on time completed trips, 164 Late 16 to 30
minute trips and 8 Late > 30 minute trips. The
total completed trips were originally out of a
total of 4,105 requested trips for this particular
day, comprised of 836 cancelled trips, 303 NoShow trips, 2,754 On time trips, 202 Late 16 to
30 minute trips, and 10 Late > 30 minute trips.
As it can be seen in the second set of data
mentioned above, even if a trip is considered on
time, it does not mean it was a completed on
time trip and the same is true for late trips.
Figure 32 below shows in a pie chart the
proportion of rides and their outcomes discussed
above with the addition of scheduled and
prescheduled trips, i.e. cancelled trips, No-Show
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trips, and executed trips that were either
prescheduled or scheduled the same day.
The Manifest was used to determine the
ambulatory status, wheelchair needs and to
confirm the pickup and drop off locations of
each rider printed in the Daily Posted Routes for
May 6, 2010. If a rider was included in the
Daily Posted Routes, but not in the Manifest,
their ambulatory status was then undetermined
and that trip would be eliminated from the data
used for analysis. The rationale for eliminating
these trips with missing ambulatory information
is that for each trip to be analyzed, the
information must be complete for each ride and
therefore all data with complete information can
be examined using the same tests and analyses.
For each trip, the minimum and maximum
public transit times, direct drive times and
mileage were determined. The public transit
times were produced using MBTA’s Trip Planner
(http://mbta.com/rider_tools/trip_planner). By
entering an origin and a destination, MBTA’s
Trip Planner generates several alternative
itineraries (routes). The total trip time of a route
typically consists of walking time, transit time
on one or more transportation lines (subway or
bus), and waiting time in case of transfers. A
rider may select the route with the longest total
public transit time (which usually has fewer
transfers), the route with the shortest time
(which usually has more transfers), or a route
with total time in-between. To compare with the
paratransit times, we selected the two extreme
times, the minimum and the maximum public
transit times. The direct drive times and mileage
were found using Google Maps (http://
maps.google.com/maps?hl=en&tab=wl). The
data collection process of the public transit times
and direct drive times along with mileage URL’s
was automated using a software program
developed for this research to ease the manual
process. The software program reads a set of
origins-destinations from an Excel (.xlsx)
spreadsheet to the web site and retrieves and
stores the output data into the same spreadsheet.
The collected data were subsequently checked

FIGURE 3
A ClASSIFICATION OF PARATRANSIT TRIPS
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individually to ensure their accuracy. The
pickup and drop off locations of prescheduled
trips were verified using the Manifest to ensure
accuracy of the times. For each trip, it was
determined whether or not it was a shared ride, if
a wheelchair was needed for each passenger and
the passenger’s ambulatory status.

can make inferences regarding the difference of
the means of the two populations (μY - μX) by
making inferences regarding the mean of the
differences, μD. If the observations from each
population are normal, the Student’s t-statistic
can be used to test a hypothesis about the
difference in the means (Walpole et al., 2002).

Once the minimum and maximum public transit
times and the direct drive times were obtained,
the data was then filtered to determine what data
was viable for analysis. The exclusions were
trip data for which public transit was not an
option, data for which ambulatory information
was not available for a particular rider, no
shows, and canceled trips. There were also
some trip data that were excluded due to a zero
travel time, an unreasonable drop off arrival and/
or departure or a blank drop off arrival and/or
departure time. This type of data either
indicated that the trip was canceled, a rider was a
no-show or it was determined that the driver
may have forgotten to indicate the drop off
arrival and/or departure time. After the data was
filtered for all criteria mentioned above, the
result was 2,168 trips with viable and complete
data to analyze.

Each data set of Minimum Public Transit Time,
Maximum Public Transit Time, Actual
Paratransit Time and Maximum Allowable Ride
Time was tested for normality. Figure 4 contains
the normal probability plots and the histograms
for all data sets, obtained with Minitab statistical
15.1.0.0 software. As it can be seen, all data sets
fail the normality test. However, even though the
data sets do not fit the normal distribution,
hypothesis testing could still be performed since
the sample size is very large and the population
is not very skewed. Under these assumptions
the Student’s t distribution gives a good
approximation to the sampling distribution of
the average difference D, (Levine et al., 2001).
Hence the Student’s t-statistic was used in
hypothesis testing.

To compare the quality of paratransit services to
the scheduled transit services, one can
statistically compare the means of the transit
times of rides of the two populations taken
separately, i.e., paratransit rides and public
transit rides. However, since we want to detect
any significant difference due to the
experimental process (paratransit versus public
transit) and not due to experimental units
(paratransit rides versus public transit rides), we
should analyze the data in pairs. For each trip i,
specified by the origin address and destination
address, the difference of the realized paratransit
time (xi) from the minimum or maximum
corresponding public transit time (yi) was
computed, i.e. di = yi - xi. The (xi, yi) is thus
considered a pair of observations of two random
variables (X, Y) and di an observation of their
difference, D = Y – X. Taking expectations of
both sides yields μD = μY - μX. In other words, we
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In this case, the null hypothesis (HO) is that the
difference of the means of the two populations
(μD) is equal to a certain value v, i.e. μD = v. The
alternative hypothesis (HA) is that μD > v. The
alternative hypothesis must be true if the null
hypothesis is rejected. Hypothesis testing is
designed so that the rejection of the null
hypothesis is based on evidence from the sample
that the alternative hypothesis is far more likely
to be true (Levine, et al., 2001). By observing
the descriptive statistics of the sample, v was
selected to be 3 to 4 times the standard error of
the mean lower than the sample mean difference.
Several Paired t-Tests were conducted to
determine how well THE RIDE is performing
relative to the public transit system and to the
maximum allowable riding time. Since shared
rides are expected to have higher paratransit
times than single rides, separate tests were
performed for single rides, shared rides and all
rides combined. All hypothesis tests were run
using Excel 2007’s t-test Paired Two Samples

FIGURE 4
A COMPARISON OF PUBLIC V. RIDE TRANSIT TIME PATTERNS
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for Means and Minitab’s 15.1.0.0’s Paired t-Test.
Running these tests took only seconds. The
above two software provide the same results but
different formats and statistical values that are
useful when determining whether the test was
run correctly and interpreting the results. This is
shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3 for All Data, Single
Rides, and Shared Rides, respectively, where all
times are expressed in minutes.
The results from Minitab include the sample size
N, the mean, the standard deviation, the standard
error of the mean for each data set and the 99%
lower bound for the mean difference. The Excel
results give the mean, variance, sample size for
each data set and the Pearson Correlation,
Hypothesized Mean Difference, the degrees of
freedom (df), the t-statistic, and several P(T<=t)
and t-Critical values for level of significance á =
0.005. The output from Excel and Minitab was
used to verify the results of both as well as
supplement the output with one another.
ALL DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
All data included N = 2,168 viable rides, as
discussed previously. The following three
hypotheses were tested:
D = X – Y, where X and Y are defined
below for each test.
i. X = Minimum Public Transit Time; Y =
Actual Paratransit Time.
HO : μD = 11
HA : μD > 11
ii. X = Maximum Public Transit Time; Y =
Actual Paratransit Time.
HO : μD = 24
HA : μD > 24
iii. X = Maximum Allowable Ride Time; Y =
Actual Paratransit Time.
HO : μD = 28
HA : μD > 28.
The results are shown in Table 1. In the
hypothesis test (i), for Minimum Public Transit
Time vs. Actual Paratransit Time, the t-statistic
is -3.84, the P-Value is 6.25 x 10-5 and the t
Critical one-tail is -2.578. HO is rejected because

t-statistic < t Critical one-tail and the very small
P-Value (very close to zero) strengthens the
conclusion that the alternative hypothesis HA is
true (μD > 11). In terms of paired differences,
99% of them are higher than 11.758 minutes
(99% lower bound for mean difference) and
99.99% of them (1 - P-Value) are higher than 11
minutes. Therefore, the testing supports the
statement that the average Actual Paratransit
time of a trip is more than 11 minutes faster than
the fastest (Minimum Public Transit Time) route
for that trip.
Following the remaining test results of Table 1,
one can conclude that on the average, Actual
Paratransit (ii) is 24 minutes faster than the
Maximum Public Transit Time; and (iii) exceeds
the expectation of the Maximum Allowable Ride
Time rule by 28 minutes.
Single Ride Data Analysis and Results
Out of the 2,168 total rides, there were N = 1,290
single rides. The following three hypotheses were
tested:
D = X – Y, where X and Y are defined
below for each test.
iv. X = Minimum Public Transit Time; Y =
Actual Paratransit Time.
HO : μD = 16
HA : μD > 16
v. X = Maximum Public Transit Time; Y =
Actual Paratransit Time.
HO : μD = 28
HA : μD > 28
vi. X = Maximum Allowable Ride Time; Y =
Actual Paratransit Time.
HO : μD = 34
HA : μD > 34.
For the single ride data, the following conclusions
can be drawn based on the output of Table 2: on
the average, Actual Paratransit (iv) is 16 minutes
faster than using the fastest Public Transit route;
(v) is 28 faster than the longest Public Transit route;
and (vi) exceeds the expectations of the Maximum
Allowable Ride Time rule by 34 minutes.
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TABLE 1
TEST RESULTS FOR ALL
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TABLE 2
TEST RESULTS FOR THE SINGLE RIDE DATA
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TABLE 3
TEST RESULTS FOR THE SHARED RIDE DATA

56

Journal of Transportation Management

Spring/Summer 2013

57

Shared Ride Data Analysis and Results
Out of the 2,168 total rides, there were N = 878
shared rides. The following three hypotheses
were tested:
D = X – Y, where X and Y are defined
below for each test.
vii. X = Minimum Public Transit Time; Y =
Actual Paratransit Time.
HO : μD = 3
HA : μD > 3
viii.
X = Minimum Public Transit
Time; Y = Actual Paratransit Time.
HO : μD = 16
HA : μD > 16
ix. X = Maximum Allowable Ride Time; Y =
Actual Paratransit Time.
HO : μD = 19
HA : μD > 19.
For the shared ride data, the following
conclusions can be drawn based on the output of
Table 3: on the average, Actual Paratransit (iv) is
3 minutes faster than the using the fastest Public
Transit route; (v) is 16 faster than the longest
Public Transit route; and (vi) exceeds the
expectations of the Maximum Allowable Ride
Time rule by 19 minutes. A summary of all
hypothesis testing results is provided in Table 4.
Actual Paratransit Time vs.
Direct Drive Time
All trips that were executed by the Veterans
Transportation Services contractor on 05/06/
2010 are displayed as black bullets in Figure 5.

The coordinates of each bullet’s center are the
Actual Paratransit Time and the Direct Drive
Time. The bent gray line, consisting of a
horizontal segment (for Direct Drive Time < 30
minutes) and an unbounded line segment with
the slope of 1, divides the first orthant into two
subspaces. Points that are above the line, inside
the upper subspace, correspond to rides that
violate the Maximum Allowable Riding Time
rule. As it can be seen in Figure 5, there is not a
significant amount of rides that violate the rule,
calculated to be about 6.27% of all rides. Of
Single Rides, Actual Paratransit Time exceeds
the Maximum Allowable Time 1.78% of the
time and of Shared Rides, Actual Paratransit
Time exceeds the Maximum Allowable Time
12.87% of the time. This difference happens
because when there are shared rides, it requires
longer riding times for some passengers. For
example, Rider A may be picked up at his or her
origin location and before reaching his or her
destination, the driver may pick up Rider B. If
Rider B is dropped off before Rider A, Rider A
has spent more riding time in the vehicle than he
or she would have had it been a single ride
where Rider A would have gone directly from
his or her origin location to his or her
destination. Overall, the 6.27% of rides being
over the Maximum Allowable Time is not very
many rides, considering the amount of rides
completed per day. In total, for that particular
day, it is 136 rides out of 2,168 of the rides in
our data set.

TABLE 4
AVERAGE TIMES (MINUTES) PARATRANSIT RIDES ARE SHORTER

Min Public Transit
Max Public Transit
Maximum Promised
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All Data

Single Rides
Only

11
24
28

16
28
34
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Shared Rides
Only
3
16
19

FIGURE 5
PARATRANSIT TIMES COMPLYING WITH THE MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE RIDE TIME
RULE

Concluding Remarks and Managerial
Implications
By comparing the Actual Paratransit Time to the
Minimum and Maximum Public Transit Time
and to the Maximum Allowable Ride Time, we
concluded that THE RIDE is exceeding
expectations by both being better or comparable
to the public transit provided, having a slim
chance of being late, and having a small chance
of exceeding the maximum allowable riding
time. In all cases, the average riding time was
faster than taking the public transit, being it the
Minimum Public Transit Time or the Maximum
Public Transit Time, and the average riding time
was significantly less than the Maximum
Allowable Ride Time.
There are some adjustments THE RIDE could
make in order to decrease costs. Since the rides
that are provided are exceeding expectations and
in some cases exceeding them considerably, we
concluded that customer satisfaction is high
while costs are high. In order to lower cost,
customer satisfaction has to be sacrificed. For
example, shared rides can be utilized more to

lower costs. More shared rides would mean
employing fewer drivers, deploying fewer
vehicles with lower fuel consumption, but would
also mean longer riding times for riders and
subsequently lower customer satisfaction.
If one was to look at All Data and the hypothesis
testing summary results of Table 4, it can be seen
that overall riding times are 11 minutes faster
than Minimum Public Transit Times, 24 minutes
faster than Maximum Public Transit Time, and
exceeds the expectation of the Maximum
Allowable Ride Time rule by 28 minutes. This
can be interpreted as if there is 11 minutes or
even 24 minutes that THE RIDE could be using
and still be within the comparative requirements
of public transit in the Greater Boston area
imposed by the ADA rules. In the same respect,
THE RIDE created 28 minutes of extra cushions
for the Maximum Allowable Ride Times. This
means that THE RIDE and/or its Contractors
could loosen up some of their constraints in their
DSS to allow for more shared rides and perhaps
lengthen riding times slightly, but could
potentially save some costs to run the program.
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When looking at the Shared Ride Data, it turned
out to be worse than both the All Data and
Single Ride Data analysis where riding times are
only shorter by 3 minutes against the Minimum
Public Transit times and 16 minutes against the
Maximum Public Transit times. Also, it is not as
fast versus the Maximum Allowable Riding
Time at about 19 minutes faster than the other
categories. Because they are shared rides, riders
endure longer riding times due to the scheduling
of pickups and drop-offs that are not consecutive
to each rider. It may cause concern to allow
more share rides for customers, but may make
sense for cutting costs as even the shared rides
are exceeding expectations and paratransit
service is quite comparable to public transit
whether be it the minimum or maximum public
transit times.
In the same notion, with regards to the Single
Ride Data, it can be seen that these times are
significantly better than All Observations and
Shared Ride Data. For Single Ride Data, the
overall riding times are better than Minimum
and Maximum Public Transit Times by 16
minutes and 28 minutes, respectively. The
Single Ride Data is running about 34 minutes
faster than the Maximum Allowable Riding
Times. It is very clear in this case that allowing
for more shared rides could lower costs while
maintaining an acceptable level of customer
service. In general, THE RIDE and its
Contractor, Veterans Transportation Services, are
performing very well when all the Paratransit
services are compared. It is apparent that THE
RIDE is comparable to quality of the public
transit service provided locally. In other words,
THE RIDE passes the performance test with
flying colors and gives room for further cost
savings, while abiding by the Maximum
Allowable Riding Times rule.
Learned from the successful implementation of
THE RIDE, other transit agencies may exploit
the proposed DSS framework. There are three
key elements for a successful implementation of
the DSS for transit agencies:
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1)

Development and periodic update
of accurate para-transit databases;
2)
Incorportation of pertinent transit
knowledge (e.g., transit policy) and
appropriate problem solving tools
(e.g., operations research and
statistical techniques) into model
bases;
3)
Creation of user interfaces with
both data and model bases to provide
actionable alerts, problem diagnosis,
and decision alterternatives on a realtime basis.
As evidenced by THE RIDE, the proposed DSS
can help the transit agency significantly enhance
its para-transit services and reduce operating
costs by automating routing/scheduling
procedures and making timely and structured
information available to transit authorities.
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ABSTRACT
Transportation options provide the buyer the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell transportation capacity at a future date. These options can provide shippers, carriers and logistics companies a
significant opportunity to reduce risks and increase capacity flexibility. This paper summarizes some
of these benefits, describes a number of issues to be resolved before trading transportation options
can become a reality, and presents possible resolutions for these issues.
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, Tibben-Lembke and Rogers presented
the concept of transportation options, a new tool
for providing flexibility for supply chain managers. Despite the fact that transportation options
are not currently traded, this proposed concept
has already been discussed in the supply chain
press (Lynch, 2007). Firms have begun looking
to hedge their transportation risk, and since
financial derivatives are utilized to ameliorate
the risk of physical commodities, we believe
applying them to transportation could provide
managers an additional tool to manage costs.
As described in detail below, transportation
options would be quite similar in many ways to
stock options and other financial derivatives. A
primary function of financial derivatives is for
one party to pay another participant to assume
some risk. Transportation options would work
similarly to stock options in this regard. For
example, if a shipper bought an option to ship an
item at a future date for a given price, they have
eliminated the risk of needing to pay a higher
price for that transportation at the time of the
transaction. In exchange for the payment they
receive, the option seller agrees to accept the risk
of price increases, because the seller believes
that the price will not rise to the extent that the
purchaser of the option believes is likely. Given
the sources of uncertainty companies face
(access to capacity, fuel prices, driver shortages,

etc., etc.), and the possibility for options to
reduce these risks, we believe using options to
hedge transportation costs could provide significant opportunities for parties at all stages of the
supply chain: shippers, carriers, and 3PLs.
Although we will refer to the provider of the
transportation service as a “carrier,” we believe
that transportation options could potentially be
written for any transportation modes such as
truck, ocean, air, rail, pipeline, or power line.
Additionally, the transportation provider could
be a non-asset-based third party such as an
NVOCC.
In fact, some forms of options have been traded
on ocean shipping capacity since 1985 (Gray,
1987, Alizadeh and Nomikos, 2009), when the
Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange
(BIFFEX) futures contracts were created, trading
on the 13 routes defined in the Baltic Freight
Index (BFI). Multiple sizes of ships and types of
cargoes are now included. The statistical relationships between the lanes and cargo types have
been widely studied (Haigh et al..,2004,
Nomikos and Alizadeh, 2002). These indices
have allowed shippers and carriers to manage
their risks and have found acceptance in the
ocean shipping world. We believe that a method
for hedging and managing other types of transportation risk could provide similar benefits.
Below, we address many of the issues that must
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be considered before transportation options can
be widely traded, present possible solutions for
many of these issues, and provide a list of areas
where future work is still needed.
HOW TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS
COULD WORK
A transportation option would be similar to a
stock option, and like a stock option, could come
in the form of both “puts” and “calls.” For
stocks, a call option allows the purchaser to buy
the stock at the specified price, which is called
the “strike price.” This strike price means the
investor will be able to purchase the stock at a
guaranteed price. Between the time that the
option is purchased and the exercise or strike
date, the market price may rise above the strike
price, in which case the option will be exercised
because the investor can buy the stock more
cheaply than the market price and immediately
sell it at a profit, or fall below the strike price, in
which case the option will not be exercised. In
either case, the option allows the manager to
reduce the uncertainty of future returns. If the
option may be exercised at any time prior to the
exercise date, it is known as an “American”
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option, and if it may only be exercised on the
specified date, it is known as a “European”
option (Kolb and Overdahl, 2007).
A transportation call option would give the
shipper the right to ship a given quantity on a
specific lane on a given date in the future. If
shippers are uncertain about the ability to get
access to transportation capacity in the future, or
would like to lock in transportation prices for the
future, they might be interested in purchasing
call options. With a truckload (TL) call option,
if the shipper decides against exercising the
option, the carrier does not send the truck. This
is analogous to the case of the stock option: if
the buyer of the stock option decides not to
exercise the option, the option seller keeps
possession of the stock.
As shown in Figure 1, if a shipper buys a call
option, and the market price goes above the
strike price, the shipper will never pay a price
higher than the strike price, protecting the
shipper from upward price movements. The
heavy line in Figure 1 depicts the price the
shipper would pay. If the market price exceeds
the strike price, the shipper would only pay the

strike price of the call option. At the same time,
the call option seller (also called the “writer”) is
now guaranteed that it will never see revenues
greater than the strike price.
A put option on a stock gives the holder the
right, but not the obligation, to compel the seller
of the option to take possession of the asset and
pay the specified price. A put option would give
the carrier the right to haul a shipment on a
particular date. In a transportation option, a put
option would be similar, in that the holder of the
put option would have the right to compel the
option’s seller to take temporary possession of
the asset and pay the specified price.
BENEFITS OF TRANSPORTATION
OPTIONS
Transportation options can provide a number of
different kinds of benefits for all of the participants in the transportation marketplace. Both
shippers and transportation providers face
uncertainties that could be hedged through the
utilization of options. These risks include
problems such as increasing or decreasing fuel
costs. Options could ameliorate risks such as
capacity problems that happen during the period
leading up to the Christmas season. Long term
negotiated contracts with carriers that can be
locked in for heavy freight lanes are useful to
manage uncertainty, but contracts with carriers
often include volume requirements or implied
freight levels to receive the negotiated pricing.
Options would be useful for both heavy freight
lanes and for lower volume and less repetitive
moves. If a driver or equipment shortage
develops, or threat of a strike similar to the one
that UPS faced in 1997 (Brannigan and
Mathews, 1997), using options could allow
shippers a steady supply of transportation
capacity.
Removing Sources of Risk
There are many sources of uncertainty for ship
pers, carriers, and third party logistics service

companies whose risk could be reduced through
the use of options. For example:
• Access to capacity in tight markets or lanes due
to seasonal fluctuations (e.g. pre-holiday shipments)
• Access to capacity in tight markets or lanes due
to cyclical fluctuations (e.g. driver shortages)
• Fuel price risks
• Economic fluctuations (e.g. a booming
economy means all transportation capacity is
tight)
• Equipment positioning imbalances (e.g. due to
product flows, equipment is available in a location but is unavailable where it is required)
In 2006 through 2008, there were numerous
reports of a tight supply for truck drivers in the
U.S. and Europe (Ajlouny, 2006; Lynch, 2006).
As the price of diesel spiked in the summer of
2008, and the economy slowed later in that same
year, a large number of trucks were taken out of
service and shipped to places such as Eastern
Europe (Calabrese, 2008). As the economy
continues to recover, there may be capacity
issues. In Europe, new laws mandating the
tracking and monitoring of driver behavior are
expected to further tighten the supply of drivers
(Zuckerman, 2008). When transportation capacity is tight, costs could be expected to rise, and if
options can provide an ability to reduce the risk
of paying higher shipping costs, they should be
quite attractive for shippers.
In the summer of 2007, a U.S. consumer goods
company paid a large 3PL above-market rates in
order to have guaranteed access to transportation
capacity before a major holiday. The shipper
paid the full above-market price, regardless of
whether it used the capacity or not. If the shipper
would have had the choice to just buy an option
for that capacity, it would have been much better
off: it would have had the same guaranteed
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access to capacity, but at a much lower cost
(Sanders, 2010).
One large source of uncertainty for supply chain
firms is uncertainty in fuel prices. In recent
years, the price of fuel has varied significantly.
Although carriers have some ability to protect
themselves through the use of fuel surcharges,
shippers have no such ability, and call options
could protect them from the risk of rising prices.
By buying a call option, the shipper ensures that
it will never pay a higher price for the capacity
than the strike price of the option. Figure 2
shows the fluctuation in prices for No. 2 diesel
fuel over the past 20 years from March of 1994
through February of 2014 (EIA, 2014).
Although prices have climbed steadily over this
time period, there has been a significant amount
of short-term fluctuation within that period, as
well. Figure 3 shows how much prices changed
over a rolling four week period. For example, in
September, 2005, diesel prices were 20% higher
than they had been just four weeks earlier. Then,
in November, prices fell 20% compared with
where than they had been just four weeks prior.
Clearly, fuel prices can change significantly in a
short period of time.
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U.S. economic variability can be a source of
significant fluctuations in the price and availability of transportation capacity. As U.S. demand
for goods manufactured overseas has increased
over recent decades, access to transportation
capacity has become an increasingly critical
resource for retailers, distributors and manufacturers. Cyclical increases and decreases in the
U.S. economy can have a significant impact on
the demand for transportation capacity. In 2007
and 2008, the declining value of the U.S. dollar
increased U.S. exports (New York Times, 2008).
Financial Benefit of Call Options
For Both Parties
In order for options to be traded, they have to be
attractive to both carriers and shippers. As
discussed above, a call option allows shippers to
purchase the benefit of not worrying about
transportation costs increasing beyond the strike
price. Regardless of whether they use the option
or not, they benefit from its existence.
A call option also has to benefit the carrier. If
the value of the premium from selling a call
option is enough to stimulate the carrier to sell,
then the option will be perceived to be profitable. Consider, for example, a single-driver load

from the Port of Los Angeles to Chicago. In
early March 2014, a spot-market quote for two
weeks in advance was $3,179 (Freightquote,
2014). For the carrier, suppose gross margins
are 10%. So the carrier's costs for the shipment
would be $2,861 and gross profit is $318. If the
shipper bought the option from the carrier for
$75, that would be a 24% increase in the carrier's
gross profits from the shipment. Even if the
shipper does not use the truck, the carrier keeps
the $75 payment. The lower the carrier’s margin, the greater the percentage increase in profits
from the option premium. For example, if the
carrier’s margins were 5%, ($159), the $75
option premium would represent a 47% increase
in profits for the carrier.
If the spot market price rises to above $3,179,
the shipper would exercise the option. If the
spot market price is $3,254, the carrier’s revenues are the same as if there had been no
option, receiving a payment of $3,179 for the
shipment, plus the $75 option fee, and still
makes its profits $318. If the market price rises
above $3,254, the carrier receives less profit
from having sold the option than it would have if
it had not sold the option. If the market price has
increased because of supply imbalances or short-

term driver shortages, the carrier’s costs (of
$2,861) would likely not increase, and the
carrier’s original profit of $318 remains intact.
If the carrier’s costs have not increased significantly, the carrier’s profit is unchanged by the
rising market price, because the revenues and
costs are unchanged. If the price rises higher,
the carrier is not making as much profit as it
could make at the market price, but is still
making the profits of $318.
However, this is less profit than the carrier
would receive from carrying the load at the
higher market price, but the original profit has
not been forfeited. If fuel or labor costs increase, the carrier’s costs must increase above
$3,254 before the carrier will actually lose
money by carrying the load for $3,179. That
would be a cost increase of $393, almost 14%.
PRICING TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS
Deciding on the price for buying or selling an
option is clearly important. Sophisticated
models would be required, based on historical
data and economic projections, to figure out how
much a company should be willing to pay for an
option.
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In a way, transportation options are like an
insurance policy a shipper can buy to guarantee
the price to be paid will not exceed a given
value. With insurance, companies charge a
premium to take on risk for the company. The
premium is set at a point where the policyholder
feels the benefit in reduced risk exceeds the
premium, and yet at a point that the insurance
company can make a profit by pooling the risk
of insuring a large number of policies. In much
the same way that the actuarial field has been
developed to set insurance premiums, and
options pricing models have been developed to
set premiums for stock options, a mathematical
study of transportation options pricing is also
required.
In the stock exchanges and commodities markets, derivatives have been successful. The
primary reason for their success is that they have
attracted many different types of traders, and
they increase liquidity in the market. The trader
can control a large amount of stock with a
minimal stake. When a trader wants to take one
side of an options contract, there is usually no
problem finding another trader that is willing to
take the other side.
USING PUT OPTIONS
In a stock transaction, a put option gives the
holder the right, but not the obligation, to require
someone to take possession of the asset and pay
the specified price for the asset. If the price of a
stock falls below the strike price, the option
holder would exercise the option, forcing the
option seller to buy the stock at the abovemarket strike price. In a transportation option, a
put option would be similar, in that the holder of
the put option would have the right to require the
put option’s seller to take temporary possession
of the asset and pay the specified price.
For example, suppose a shipper sells a put
option to a carrier to move a load on a given lane
for $1,500, and suppose the carrier pays $100 to
the shipper for this option. This gives the carrier
the right to require the shipper to use the
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carrier’s trucks at that price. Suppose the spot
market price for the lane is $1,300 on the
option’s strike date. The carrier would decide to
exercise the put option, which means that the
shipper is obligated to use the truck on the lane
and pay $1,500 to the carrier. If the spot market
price were above $1,500, the carrier would not
exercise the put option, because the carrier can
receive a higher payment on the spot market.
This guarantees the carrier a revenue stream,
which is why it would buy a put. From the
shipper’s perspective, if the spot market price is
below $1,500, the shipper will be forced to pay
above-market rates for the lane, because it sold
this put option.
The shipper is essentially selling an insurance
policy to the carrier, protecting the carrier
against the possibility of rates being too low.
The shipper must carefully consider its beliefs
about future prices, in order to properly put a
price on how much it wants to receive in order to
be willing to sell the put option. If a shipper
thinks there is a realistic possibility that the
market price will not be below $1,500, the
shipper should consider the possibility of selling
a put option.
If the carrier thinks that fluctuations in demand
for trucks on the lane and fluctuations in the
price of fuel make it a realistic possibility that
the spot market price might be below $1,500, the
carrier should consider the possibility of buying
the put option. The amount the carrier would be
willing to pay for this risk protection will depend
on its tolerance for risk, and its beliefs about
future prices.
Another reason for using put options is to bound
the risk realized by a call option. As depicted in
Figure 4, if a carrier or 3PL sells call options to
shippers, it places a cap on the highest price it
can expect to receive for that service. If a carrier
or 3PL buys a put option that places a lower
bound on the price that it will receive. In Figure
4, both the upper and lower bounds provided by
a call option and a put option are shown.

Thus, carriers or third parties have a reason to
consider buying a put option, and shippers have
a reason to consider selling a put option. For
both, the put option represents a type of insurance policy, or hedge, protecting the firm against
unfavorable prices in the spot market. In order
for a transaction to take place, the amount of
protection offered must be sold for a price both
think represents a fair price.

To some extent, a logistics third-party acts
similarly to a stockbroker: a stockbroker advises
clients on which investments to make and when,
and the 3PL advises shippers about which
carriers to use and when. A 3PL may also act
like a stockbroker by suggesting opportunities,
providing predictions about the future state of
the market, and helping the client firm decide
when to lock in long-term pricing.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR 3PLS

A 3PL could guarantee lower maximum prices
for its shippers by buying call options from its
carriers. If one particular shipper does not need
the capacity, perhaps one of the many other
shippers will. Similarly, it could sell put options
to its carriers. When the carriers don’t exercise
the puts, it can bank the premiums. When the
carriers do use the puts, it can use the premiums
to offset the higher rates.

Many transportation transactions are facilitated
through a non-asset based third party logistics
provider (3PL). A put option would work well
with a 3PL positioned in between the shipper
and the carrier. One of the duties of the thirdparty is to match and consolidate supply and
demand for capacity, charging a commission for
the service. If transportation options became a
reality, the 3PL could benefit by selling financial
derivatives to both sides in addition to transportation and logistics services.

In the current environment, when a 3PL is
responding to a bid, it has to tell the customer
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that it has no way to know for sure what the
prices are going to be in the future. Typically, a
third party or a carrier will write a contract that
allows them to place transportation surcharges
on the shipper. If the 3PL could buy or sell
options, it would be more able to protect both its
customer and its transportation supplier. By
buying call options, the 3PL could offer its
customers guaranteed freight rates, which would
be a competitive advantage. Currently, 3PLs are
often on “both sides of the table,” buying and
selling transportation capacity. 3PLs might find
options a valuable way to reduce the risk exposure to customers, suppliers and themselves. On
the other hand, a 3PL may believe that it has
sufficient capacity reserves to be able to absorb
the market risks of other companies, and it may
choose to sell options.
POSSIBLE RISKS OF FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES
Because much of the credit crisis of 2008 was
related to financial derivatives, description of the
potential risks of transportation options is in
order. Also, because there was widespread
belief that speculators had significantly affected
the price of oil, we will attempt to address the
possibilities for transportation options to be
similarly affected by speculation.
First of all, the authors do not believe that
transportation options will provide any significant risk to the transportation markets. Much of
the “subprime meltdown” of 2007 and “credit
crunch” was exacerbated by the heavy use of
complicated risk derivatives in the financial
markets (Mizen, 2008). The use of securities
derived from mortgages became widely accepted
in capital markets, and produced high returns.
To meet this need, mortgage professionals
actively sought customers of lower and lower
creditworthiness, (because all of the better
credit-risk individuals already had mortgages).
Based on traditional mortgage default percentages, brokers and financial professionals felt that
the risk of default was quite low, which is what
made them so attractive to investors. Unfortu70
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nately, these least-qualified buyers were going to
prove to default in much higher numbers than
predicted. Also, the mortgage-generating institutions were not concerned with the riskiness of
the loans, because they were going to sell the
loans off to be repackaged, so they would not
bear the risk of the loans (Mizen, 2008).
Thus, the risk from mortgage derivatives came
from loaning money to people that were poor
credit risks, because of an inaccurate assessment
of those risks. Because transportation options
will not be based on loaning anyone money, the
types of problems experienced during the US
credit crisis would not seem to be a likely risk
for transportation options.
There are two conclusions for us to draw from
the credit crisis, however. First, it illustrates that
financial professionals are ready to participate
heavily in any industry where they believe
financial gain may be made by carefully weighing financial risks and returns. Second, when
evaluating risks, it is absolutely imperative that
the data being used be truly representative of the
risks being considered. Another likely outcome
of the subprime credit crisis and the more recent
LIBOR scandal is that financial derivatives are
likely to become more heavily regulated and
placed under greater scrutiny. As a result,
additional emphasis must be placed on transparency and accountability as we work toward
developing transportation derivatives.
We believe that the problems encountered with
mortgage-backed securities are unlikely to occur
with transportation options. With transportation
options, a problem would show up more quickly.
If you had hired a bad carrier the feedback from
that would be quicker, and no more transactions
with that carrier would be created.
Speculation
Speculators’ only interest in the underlying
product is its price fluctuation and trying to
guess its future direction; they have no need for
the actual good. Speculators “play an important

role in the market by providing the liquidity that
makes hedging possible and assuming the risk
that hedgers are trying to eliminate” (Chance and
Brooks, 2007). They provide liquidity by stepping in to buy when there are no other interested
parties available. For those speculators, at the
strike date, there is no need for the actual product or instrument to change hands: an exchange
of money equal to the difference in value is
sufficient. Such products are “cash settled.”
However, in the case of transportation options,
the whole reason companies are interested in the
options is to hedge the risk of transportation
costs. If capacity is scarce, the call option holder
may not be satisfied to receive a payment for the
difference between the strike price and the
current spot-market price. What they really need
and want is the transportation capacity at the
negotiated price. However, if a more centralized
spot market existed, and the shipper felt confident that it would, in fact, be able to purchase
the capacity at the spot market price, the shipper
should be willing to accept a cash-settled payment.
Dangers of Options
Options can be very useful instruments. They
can be utilized for hedging, speculation, and
arbitrage. They also have inherent dangers built
into them. Sometimes traders who are supposed
to hedge risks can follow an arbitrage strategy
that becomes irresponsible speculation. The
results of such speculation can be disastrous.
Nick Leeson at Barings Bank in Singapore
provides an example of this. Mr. Leeson, was an
employee of the Singapore office in 1995, and
was looking for arbitrage opportunities between
the Nikkei 225 futures prices on the Singapore
Exchange and those on the Osaka Exchange
(Hull, 2008). As he began to speculate, he
incurred losses which he was able to hide at first.
He then took larger speculative positions to
recover the huge losses, but in the end only
made the losses worse. The total loss was close
to $1 billion. As a result, Barings Bank, which
had operated successfully for 200 years, was put
out of business.

Firms must use options carefully and be utilized
to hedge risk wisely. Firms could use options to
find arbitrage opportunities to reduce transportation cost. Firms have to be careful that they do
not cross the line into highly risky market speculation.
STANDARDIZING OPTIONS
An important factor that has made the Baltic Dry
Index possible was that ocean shipping routes
lend themselves very readily to standardized
lanes, given the small number of international
ports, as compared to the number of possible
origin and destination points for truckload
shipments. In order for an active market in
options to exist, a standardized set of widely
traded options must be created.
Lanes
A set of key lanes could be determined that
would be broadly representative of the conditions in the market, in the same way that the
S&P 500 or the Dow Jones Industrial Average is
widely watched in the stock market. These lanes
should probably be some of the highest-volume
lanes, freight-wise, but also the ones with the
highest volume of options activity. As options
trading around transportation has not yet begun,
it is not possible to know which lanes will
generate the most trading activity. However, it
seems likely that the highest-volume freight
lanes, shipment-wise, may be among the most
actively traded. Demand and supply on transportation lanes are typically asymmetrical. For
example, the cost of a truckload originating from
Reno, Nevada and delivered to Los Angeles,
California is different than the cost of a truckload moving from Los Angeles to Reno. This is
because the demand for delivered freight is
greater in Los Angeles than it is in Reno.
Off-Lane Origins and Destinations
A convention should be developed regarding
how far off of a lane the origin or destination
may be for the shipment to still be considered in
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the lane. For example, suppose an option from
Los Angeles to Chicago is going to be exercised
at a price of $3,000. The distance is roughly
2,000 miles. Suppose the shipper actually wants
a delivery made to Kenosha, Wisconsin, 65
miles north of Chicago: Should it be allowed?
A convention for off-lane origins and destinations could to be developed to facilitate option
settlement. If a shipper bought a Port of Long
Beach to Detroit option, and wants to use it to
haul a load from the port to Lansing, Michigan
which is approximately 80 miles from Detroit,
an agreed upon settlement mechanism to account
for the extra distance would need to be developed. Perhaps, this mechanism could be built
into the option. For example, for shorter distances, under 500 miles, a maximum of 50
additional miles would be allowed, and for
longer distances, a percentage maximum could
be allowed. Alternatively, perhaps off-lane
points of any distance should be allowed, but a
surcharge should be added, related to the distance from the lane to the point.
Cost for Off-Lane Points
If a shipper wants to exercise an option and send
the shipment from a slightly different source or
to a slightly different destination, it would seem
the shipper should pay an additional cost. How
much additional should the shipper pay? There
are several possibilities. Consider the Los
Angeles to Kenosha example mentioned above.
• One solution would be to say that the exercise
price of the option is $3,000/2000 miles = $1.50/
mile, and the shipper must pay this additional
cost for the distance from Chicago to Kenosha
(65 miles): $97.50.
• Perhaps the shipper should pay $195, twice the
cost of driving from Chicago to Kenosha, to
represent the deadhead miles the truck will incur
in getting back to Chicago to pick up another
load.
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• Alternatively, the shipper could argue that
when driving from LA to Kenosha, taking the
shortest interstate routes, Kenosha is only 30
miles farther from LA than Chicago is. Perhaps
the shipper should pay 30 miles of additional
distance, plus a 65 mile deadhead charge back to
Chicago, $142.50
At this point, it is not possible to predict which
of these policies will be put in place, but it
seems that the strongest arguments can be made
in favor of the last two policies. Both compensate the carrier for the extra mileage. Shippers
would prefer the third option, carriers the second
one. Also notice that the same issue arises for
origin points which are not right at the specified
origin, and a similar policy will need to be
implemented for off-lane origins.
Arbitrage
It is important to note that these off-lane costs
are important for providing arbitrage opportunities. Arbitrage is when someone finds an unexplained difference between the pricing of two
commodities, and takes advantage of the pricing
misalignment to profit. As multiple parties
exploit the arbitrage opportunity, the price of the
under-priced asset goes up, and the price of the
over-priced asset goes down, and the arbitrage
opportunity ends. In this way, the ability of
traders to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities is very important in maintaining the liquidity
of the markets.
Off-lane pricing provides for the possibility of
arbitrage in the following way. Suppose the
price of LA-Chicago is high, and the price of
LA-Detroit is low. A shipper could buy the LADetroit lane, and pay the off-lane charges to send
the shipment to Chicago, and still be cheaper
than buying the LA-Chicago lane. As more
shippers take advantage of this, the price of LAChicago will fall, and LA-Detroit will increase,
until the prices are brought into alignment.

Additional Stops
A related issue is whether additional stops along
the way may be requested. If some mechanism
can be created to allow this possibility, it would
increase interest in the options. In some way, the
shipper must agree to pay some additional cost
for additional stops. This additional cost will
probably include:
• An additional cost for each additional stop
added to the route
• A cost proportional to the distance the stops
add onto the trip length
• A charge per hour required by the stop
At a minimum, the additional costs must be
sufficient to cover the carrier’s additional labor
and fuel costs generated by the stops. Also, the
carrier probably would like to maximize the
number of loads it can move per week, and
would rather not make a lot of stops, and would
rather have the cost per stop to be rather high, to
serve as a disincentive for shippers to request a
lot of stops. For that reason, the cost per mile
for the additional distance would likely be higher
than the cost per mile of the shipment overall.
Perhaps one of the formulas mentioned above
will be used. However, it is likely that the cost
will be proportional to the total number of miles
added to the trip by the stops. The charge for the
additional mileage may be some multiple of the
cost per mile of the rest of the trip, say 1.5 or 2
times the regular mileage charge. If the shipper
is going to request any stops, those would likely
need to be specified at the time that the shipper
informs the carrier of the intent to use the option.
Timing
To further simplify the trading of common lanes,
a convention must be decided upon for the dates
of the options. Carriers and shippers alike need
to have agreement on the windows when the
options can be used. Again, the more standard-

ization that can be brought into the options
market, the more efficient the market should be.
Also, carriers and shippers do not want to have
to keep track of the differing conventions used
by different carriers, shippers, or marketplaces.
The whole point of transportation options is to
reduce uncertainty about future shipments for
carriers and shippers. The options must provide
enough certainty about the timing of the shipments in order to serve the needs of the shippers,
so they can rely on these shipments to meet their
needs. Otherwise, there would be no incentive
for shippers to use them.
We propose that options be traded for each
calendar week of the year, where a week is
defined as 12:00 am Sunday to 11:59 pm Saturday ET. For example, a shipper may buy a call
option for week 48, to have a guaranteed price
for last-minute deliveries before the end of the
Christmas selling season.
Another possibility would be that a shipper may
seek to purchase options good for any week in a
range of weeks, over a 4, 8, or 12 week period.
This would give a shipper much more flexibility,
but it would place a lot more uncertainty on the
carrier, making it much harder for the carrier to
plan for the future. Given that the carrier is
accepting considerably more risk, these options
should carry a much higher risk premium.
Advance Notice (Strike Dates)
Standardization is also required for how much
notice the option holder must give before exercising the option. There are several likely possibilities:
• One way would be to say that the decision to
use or not use an option must be communicated
by 5:00 p.m. on Friday of the prior week, and at
that point, the day of the following week on
which the option is to be used must be specified,
but the final pickup time on that date can be
specified later.
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• Similarly, the shipper could be required to give
notice of intent to use the option by some time,
say 5:00 p.m. Friday, and that the actual time
(and location) of the shipment must be specified
at least 24 hours in advance.
• The final way these could be structured would
be to say that the option holder must give at least
so many hours of advance notice, perhaps 24
hours. This period of advance notice should be
sufficient to allow the carriers to have the necessary equipment in place by the required time.
Some conventions will need to be determined
regarding other details of the shipments, for
example, regarding holidays. Perhaps the
consensus will be that national holidays will be
blackout days on which the options cannot be
used. Alternatively, they could be treated like
regular days, or a surcharge of some percentage,
or a fixed dollar surcharge will be added.
Non-Compliance Penalties
If a carrier promises to provide service to a call
option buyer, and it fails to deliver as promised,
the carrier must face some form of punishment,
and the same would hold for the seller of a put
option. It would seem likely that this punishment would include a significant financial
penalty for the event, and a long-term consequence of being barred from participating in
trading either transportation options, or if the
trading is taking place on an established change
such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
being barred from participating in that exchange
in the future. If the firm has too many noncompliance events in a given period of time,
SEC involvement may be required. At a minimum, the financial penalty needs to be large
enough that no carrier would decide to abandon
its obligation, because abandoning it would be
cheaper than fulfilling it. The penalty should be
large enough to cause carriers to do everything
they can do to provide the promised service.
On the other hand, these options will involve
large vehicles traveling on public roads. Equip74
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ment breakdowns and unforeseeable major
traffic situations can happen. If a carrier has
taken reasonable and prudent efforts to provide
the capacity, but an unforeseeable incident
makes the carrier late, the penalties probably
should not be draconian.
Premium Services
Separate options should be sold for team and
single-driver service on a given lane. As a
majority of cross-country loads are single-driver,
they will likely represent the majority of interest
in options. With a single driver, Los Angeles to
Chicago takes four days versus only two for
team drivers. However, teams cost 25% more
than single driver rate. Some carriers may
decide to offer options that could be “upgraded”
to other services, like team drivers, or refrigerated loads.
MANAGING TRANSPORTATION
OPTIONS
For a company using transportation options, it
needs to be able to track and manage those
options, and be able to decide when to buy or
sell them. The need for options by shippers,
carriers and 3PLs will be closely related to their
future transportation needs, so any tool for
managing options needs access to as much
information as possible about those future needs.
The most likely solution is for any Options
Management System (OMS) to be tightly linked
to the company’s transportation management
system (TMS), perhaps as a module of the TMS.
In the TMS, the OMS will have access to all of
the company’s existing future transportation
needs and plans. Shippers will want to track the
eventual shipments via their TMS, so obviously
a linkage between the OMS and the TMS will be
important.
Having estimates of future transportation needs
for upcoming peak shipping seasons would seem
a good way to maximize the benefits of using
options. However, many companies may not be
making plans very far into the future via their

TMS, so some companies will need to expand
their abilities to forecast freight needs to maximize their benefits from options.

an exchange, so future work is needed to identify
more clearly what the “standard terms” of a
transportation option are likely to look like.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK

Once the terms of the options are more readily in
focus, work is needed to properly value the
options. Because of their similarity to financial
and commodity options, it is likely that the
models and methodologies for valuing transportation options will borrow heavily from the
existing financial literature.

Transportation options could provide buyers and
sellers the opportunity to hedge transportation
capacity and cost. As described above, options
can provide shippers, carriers and logistics
companies a significant opportunity to reduce
risks.
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ABSTRACT
This manuscript compares the three dimensions (Process Strategy, Market Strategy, and Information
Strategy) of the Bowersox Daugherty (1987) logistics strategy typology among five disparate
countries by integrating the findings of previous empirical research. The appropriateness of the three
Bowersox/Daugherty dimensions when combined into the construct Overall Logistic Strategy (OLS)
are assessed. The role of OLS impact on Organizational Competitiveness (COMP) through two
intervening variables LCE (Logistics Coordination Effectiveness) and CSC (Customer Service
Commitment) is evaluated. The findings indicate that OLS is an appropriate descriptor of logistics/
supply chain management in a wide range of cultures and that the integration of OLS, LCE, and CSC
is useful in explaining COMP across cultures. The findings of this research are discussed in the
context of earlier perspectives on organizational strategy and overall logistics strategy.

INTRODUCTION
The Bowersox/Daugherty (1987) typology has
been the subject of study for over twenty years.
Previous research has examined that typology in
the United State and Canada, longitudinally in
the United States, and comparatively in China,
Ghana, Guatemala, and Turkey. Because of
differences in cultures data collection
methodologies have varied. This research posits
that the Bowersox/Daugherty typology may be a
robust framework for further study of logistics/
supply chain management. This work is also
useful in addressing the concerns of Luo, Van
Hoek, and Ross (2001) that cross-cultural
logistics research has lagged. Several recent
studies have compared logistics/supply chain
management strategies in China, Ghana,
Guatemala, and Turkey with practices in the

United States. As a result, the authors believe
that the examination of these studies would
provide insights into the value of the Bowersox/
Daugherty typology as a framework for studying,
describing, and explaining logistics/supply chain
management across cultures.
This manuscript is organized into seven sections.
The first two sections contain the introduction
and literature review, and they provide an
overview of the conceptual framework for the
study. Sections three and four contain the
research methodology and data analysis and
results. The fifth section discusses the findings
while the sixth section presents the authors’
conclusions. The final section provides
implications for practitioners, teachers and
researchers of logistics/supply chain
management.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Researchers have found ample data to support
the Bowersox and Daugherty (1987) logistics
management decision-making typology (Clinton
and Closs, 1997; McGinnis and Kohn, 1993,
1997 and 2002; McGinnis, Kohn, and Spillan,
2010). In addition there is an emerging body of
research exploring this typology in different
cultures (McGinnis, Harcar, Kara, and Spillan,
2011; McGinnis, Spillan, Kara, and Domfeh,
2012; and Spillan, McGinnis, Kara, Yi, 2013).
However, there has been no substantive research
focusing on the relevance of Bowersox/
Daughtery typology in different cultural
environments.
Bowersox and Daugherty (1987) completed a
comprehensive study of logistics integration in
1987. In this research they identified three
distinctly different logistics management
strategy types that firms have used in their
decision-making. They are summarized as
follows:
The objective of Process Strategy is to
manage flows and control activities that
“give rise to cost”. In current
terminology they are referred to as “cost
drivers.”
The objective of Market Strategy is to
reduce the complexity faced by
customers. For example, this strategy
may try to provide a single point of
contact for customers that source
multiple products from different
divisions, or facilities, of the same firm.
The objective of Information Strategy is
to coordinate information flows
throughout the channel of distribution
that facilitates cooperation and
coordination among channel (supply
chain in today’s vocabulary) members.
The three components that comprise the
Bowersox/Daugherty typology have been tested
by McGinnis and Kohn (1993, 1997 and 2002)
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in studies which sampled subjects from large
U.S. manufacturing firms. They found that
process and market strategies were emphasized
when logistics strategies were intense. They also
found that both strategies were present at
moderate levels when firms used a balanced
strategy approach, and both strategies were
present only at low levels when firms used an
unfocused strategy. These studies indicated that
the three dimensions (logistics process strategy,
market strategy and information strategy) have
an important effect on a firm’s success. They did
find that the three dimensions of logistics
strategy would be more likely combined rather
than used separately as Bowersox and Daughtery
(1987) originally intended.
In 1997 Clinton and Closs sampled 818 U.S. and
Canadian firms to assess the significance of the
Bowersox/Daughterty typology. They concluded
that there was a clear overlap of the three
strategies (process, market, information) and that
this is to be expected because logistics performs
the same activities regardless of the overall
logistics strategy.
Further research focused on small firms (Spillan,
Kohn, and McGinnis, 2010). Small firms are the
largest employer of human resources and rely on
logistics to accomplish their goals. The authors
concluded that the strategies of small and large
U.S. manufacturing firms vary in degree more
than on type. Market, Process, and Information
strategies were present in both small and large
firms. In addition, the authors concluded that
the logistics strategy outcomes of small and
large firms were similar. Finally, it was
concluded that the Bowersox/Daugherty
typology was applicable to United States
manufacturing firms regardless of size.
In recent years there have been three studies of
comparative logistics. McGinnis, Harcar, Kara,
and Spillan (2011) compared logistics strategies
in the United States, Guatemala, and Turkey. In
each case confirmatory factor analysis was used
to assess the validity of OLS and SEM was used
to test the validity of the overall model of OLS-

LCE-CSC-COMP. In all three countries OLS
was supported but support for the overall model
was mixed, with support for the United States
and Guatemalan data but insignificant support
for the Turkish data. In another study McGinnis,
Spillan, Kara, and Domfeh (2012) compared
United States and Ghana data and found that
both OLS and the OLS-LCE-CSC-COMP model
were supported. Finally, Spillan, McGinnis,
Kara, and Yi (2013 compared Chinese and
United States data and found the both the OLS
and the OLS-LCE-CSC-COMP were supported.
As a result of the findings discussed in the
previous paragraphs the authors concluded that
an overall assessment of the Bowersox/
Daugherty typology’s robustness across cultures
would be useful. A finding of robustness would
suggest that the logistics typology (and logistics/
supply chain management strategy) is not very
“culturally bound.” Conversely, a finding of a
lack of robustness would suggest that crosscultural logistics/supply chain management
research should give greater consideration to the
cultural issues of each country.
METHODOLOGY
Measures and Questionnaire
Briefly, the study questionnaire had three parts.
In the first part, the overall logistics strategy of
the companies were measured by three
dimensions; process strategy, market strategy
and information. Respondents were requested to
determine their level of agreement with three
statements for process, market, and information
strategies for their company /division on a five
point -type scale (1 = definitely agree,
5=definitely disagree). The second part of the
questionnaire was designed to measure the
relationships among logistics strategy constructs
that are hypothesized to contribute logistics
coordination effectiveness as measured by three
statements. Similar Likert scale measures (1 =
definitely agree, 5=definitely disagree) in the
first section of questionnaire were used in the
second section as well. In the third part of the

questionnaire, we included statements to
measure customer service commitment and
company division competitiveness using the
same Likert Scale as previously used in the first
and second part of questionnaire.
Data Collection
Bilingual associates translated the designed
questionnaire into Turkish, Spanish, and
Chinese. To ensure the quality of the translation,
we used back translations to check for any
discrepancies and translation errors in all
countries. The questionnaires were pre-tested
with a small group of participants in all countries
before it was administrated. In all countries, the
results were satisfactory with respect to the
meaningfulness and the applicability of the
questions in those country environments.
The data for USA was collected in United States
manufacturing firms who were affiliates of the
Council of Supply Chain Management
Professionals (CSCMP) – previously the
Council of Logistics Management (CLM).
Respondents from manufacturing companies
were titled managers or higher in logistics,
distribution, or supply chain management and
were sampled via mail questionnaires with a prenotification letter, the questionnaire with a cover
letter, and a follow-up letter.
Turkish data was collected by distributing the
questionnaire to 500 SMEs (Small-Medium
enterprises) operating in the manufacturing
industry within the city of Istanbul in Turkey.
This sample was selected randomly from the
database of the Turkish Small Business
Administration (KOSGEB). As of 2008, the
KOSGEB database included a total of 12,270
SMEs in Istanbul, which accounts for nearly
28% of all SMEs registered throughout Turkey.
To collect the Guatemalan data, the researchers
worked through the Ministry of Economics.
Ministry of Economics staff were trained by the
researchers on the objective of the questionnaire,
what its contents were, how to complete the
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survey and how to respond to questions from the
respondents. Face-to-face interviews with
logistics, distribution and supply chain managers
from midsize and large companies located in
nine major regional centers in Guatemala were
conducted. Considering that the selection of
businesses in this large geographic area is a
substantial cross-section of the Guatemalan
business sector and provides near
representativeness of the sample data interviews
took place in several different areas including
Guatemala City, Escuintla, Villa Nueva,
Quetzaltenango, Cobán, Salamá, Chiquimula,
Sacatepéquez and Petén.
The Chinese data was gathered under the
supervision of a local researcher who is a faculty
member at a Chinese university, and is fluent in
Chinese and “American” English. The
questionnaire was then administered by students
to a random sample of a wide variety of
organizations, both large state-owned and small
and medium enterprises (SME) located over a
wide area of firms, mainly in northwest China.
A total of three hundred and sixty-one usable
questionnaires were obtained.

a score on Power Distance was not predictive of
Uncertainty Avoidance, Individualism/
Collectivism, or Masculinity/Femininity.
Taken together, the authors concluded that the
five countries were heterogeneous in terms of
size, population, economies, climate,
transportation, culture, and level of corruption.
As a result the authors felt that an assessment of
the applicability of the Bowersox/Daugherty
typology to these five countries would provide a
suitable test for its robustness for studying
logistics/supply chain management strategy
across cultures.
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
The first step was to check the construct
reliabilities for all three countries. Table 4
shows comparative average construct reliability
scores. While several of the reliabilities were
below the 0.70 level commonly suggested, the
scale items used in our study have been
previously used in several studies, have
considered having sufficient content validity
(Kohn and McGinnis, 1997), and possess
adequate levels of reliability.

Data Analysis Approach
The data analysis process followed a five-step
approach. First, selected characteristics of the
five countries (China, Ghana, Guatemala,
Turkey, and the United States) were compared.
Inspection of Table 1 indicates that the five
countries vary widely in terms of geographical
size, population size, percentage of urban
population, make-up of their work forces (in
percentages in agriculture, industry, and service),
GDP size, climate, transportation infrastructure,
and public sector corruption. There were no
apparent systematic patterns that suggested that
there was homogeneity among nations.
Next, the cultural dimensions of the five
countries were examined using Hofstede’s Cultural
Dimensions (2001). As shown in Tables 2 and 3,
there were no systematic patterns of cultural
dimensions detected among nations. For example,
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Further, it was previously concluded that these
scores are satisfactory for testing and validating
the structure reported in McGinnis, Kohn, and
Kara (2011).
Table 5 shows the mean scores for the constructs
for all five countries, the results for KMO tests
for sampling adequacy, and Bartlett’s test for
sphericity for all five countries. These measures
are used to determine the suitability of the data
for factor analysis. The KMO are 0.832, 0.900,
0.663, 0.770, and 0.823 for the USA, Guatemala,
Turkey, Ghana, and China respectively. All
levels of significance for Bartlett’s test for
sphericity are less than .005. Since all KMO
results were above 0.5 (the minimum cut off for
factor analysis) and all Bartlett results were
p<0.0001 it was concluded that all data was
suitable for factor analysis.
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis
To confirm the underlying factor structure, the
authors examined the CFA of all data sets. As
shown in Table 6, five indices were used. They
were: Chi-square, Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA) Goodness of Fit Index
(GFI), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI). The
two-step approach suggested by Anderson and
Gerbing (1988) was used to examine the
measurement model and then the structural
model. In the measurement model, the
hypothesized relationship between the nine
logistics strategic orientations and the three first
order factors were examined to understand how
well the relationships fit the data. In the
structural model, we examined the relationship
between the three first order factors (PROCSTR,
MKTGSTR, and INFSTR).
The results of the estimation of the first order
factor model revealed very strong results for all
datasets used as indicated by several different
measures (X2 USA= 31.058, X2 GUATEMALA =48.65,
and X2 TURKEY= 38.40). As suggested by
McGinnis, Kohn, and Kara (2011), we allowed
two of the error terms to be correlated. Other fit
indices also provided good levels of fit as shown
below.

order factors and a second order factor named
“overall logistics strategy.” The purpose here is
to understand how the three factors contributed
to an overall construct. The results of the second
order confirmatory factor analyses for all three
datasets showed very good fit indices.
Structural Model
The structural model was used to test the
hypotheses of all six factors tested in the
measurement model. The conceptualized
structural model for five data sets is shown as
Figure 1. Inspection of Table 7 revealed that the
all linkages were significant and the directions
of relationships were as hypothesized for the US,
Guatemala, Ghana, and China. Although the
model fit is considered acceptable, only one of
the hypothesized links for Turkish data was
significant as shown in Table 8. It appears, in
the case of Turkey, that OLS and LCE did not
have any significant influence on CSC.
However, CSC had significant influence on
competitiveness of Turkish companies.
Overall, the data from all five countries support
the conceptualization of the Bowersox/
Daugherty typology (See Appendix 1). In
addition, data from four of the five countries

· RMSEA USA=0.049; GFI USA=0.962; CFI USA=0.970
· RMSEA GUATEMALA=0.082; GFI GUATEMALA=0.940; CFI GUATEMALA=0.941
· RMSEA TURKEY=0.059; GFI TURKEY=0.962; CFI TURKEY=0.988
· RMSEA GHANA=0.082; GFI GHANA=0.954; CFI GHANA=0.917; RMSEA CHINA=0.014; GFI
=0.985; CFI CHINA=0.995).
CHINA
Although X2 value for two of the datasets were
significant at alpha < 0.05, it was not considered
to be major concern since the other fit indices
showed strong model fit. The authors concluded
that that the relationships between the items and
latent factors were confirmed by the five results
obtained from the different countries.
The last step in the process to confirm the
underlying structure of the model was to
evaluate the relationship between the three first

support the conceptualized structural model of
Overall Logistics Strategy (OLS) > Logistics
Coordination Effectiveness (LCE) > Customer
Service Commitment > Organizational
Competitiveness (COMP), while Turkish data
did not support the conceptualized structural
model. While this may be due to some other
factors not examined in the study, one could
speculate that there might be fundamental
differences among these constructs in the
Turkish market environment. However, the
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authors conclude that the agreement on the
consistency of direction of the relationships in
factor structures in all five datasets and support
for hypothesized relationships in four out of five
datasets provides persuasive support for (a) the
applicability of the Bowersox/Daugherty
typology in the assessment of logistics/supply
chain management strategy across a wide range
of economies and cultures and (b) provides
insights into the stages linking logistics/supply
chain management strategy to organizational
competitiveness. The following section
discusses relevance and implications of these
results.
DISCUSSION
The perspectives of three earlier writers clarify
the roles of logistics/supply chain management
in contributing to the competitiveness of
organizations. James D. Thompson (1967)
modeled the organization as having three layers.
First, the Technological Subsystem was most
like a closed system that needed to be isolated
from the environment in order to perform well
on hard measures of performance. This
isolation, or buffering, could be achieved via
sealing (isolating the organization from the
external environment), buffering (stockpiling
materials, planned maintenance, training),
smoothing (forecasting and reducing fluctuations
in sales via scheduling and sales promotions),
adapting (planning), and rationing (prioritizing
customers, establishing priorities, and setting
rules). The second layer is the Institutional
Subsystem which deals with the external
environment, which is most like an open system
that has to respond to generalized, often difficult
to measure, norms. This means that the
Institutional Subsystem must be able to interact
naturally with its external environment with the
goal being the long-term well being of the
organization. The third layer, the Administrative
Subsystem, mediates between the Technological
and Institutional subsystems, simultaneously
seeking flexibility from the Technological
Subsystem (to permit administrative discretion)
and commitment from the Institutional
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Subsystem (to permit technological
achievement). This creates a “paradox of
administration” where the organization
simultaneously seeks to reduce uncertainty in the
short-run in order to score well on technological
measures of performance while achieving
flexibility in the long run for greater control in a
dynamic environment.
These insights from Thompson (1967) provide
perspectives on the three components of Overall
Logistics Strategy (OLS) and the conceptualized
structural model. For example, Process Strategy
(PROCSTR) emphasizes the importance of cost
management and efficiency, which are primarily
Technical Subsystem concerns. Market Strategy
(MKTGSTR) focuses on simplifying
transactions to reduce complexity faced when
doing business with the organization, which
might be considered as primarily Administrative
Subsystem concerns. Information Strategy
(INFOSTR) focuses on cooperation and
coordination among channel members, which
appears to be primarily an Institutional
Subsystem priority. As a result, the role of
Overall Logistics Strategy (OLS) can be thought
of as being one aspect of managing the “paradox
of administration” where its three components
(PROCSTR, MKTGSTR, and INFOSTR)
interact to balance the need for efficiency and for
flexibility. While the generalizations stated in the
previous sentences may oversimplify the roles of
PROCSTR, MKTGSTR, and INFOSTR, one can
begin to see that OLS must constantly balance
the need for efficiency and cost management
with flexibility and responsiveness in a dynamic
organizational environment.
In a similar manner, the insights from Thompson
(1967) provide a perspective on the structural
model shown in Figure 1. With the exception of
the Turkish data, the path coefficients indicate
that the OLS > LCE > CSC network contributes
to Organizational Competitiveness (COMP).
Here, in the authors’ opinion, the primary focus
of LCE is on execution (Technical subsystem
issue) while CSC is on coordination within the
channel (Administration and Institutional

subsystem issues) which enables the firm to
respond (COMP) to the external environment.
Shapiro and Heskett (1985) summarized
logistics management as characterized by a
dichotomy similar to that discussed by
Thompson (1967). On one hand the logistics
manager must pay attention to the day-to-day
details (summarized as tactical, short-term,
quantitative, and detailed) while being able to
see the big picture (summarized as broad,
qualitative, long-term, and strategic). Here the
paradox is captured by PROCSTR, MKTGSTR,
and INFOSTR. Each has a primary focus on the
execution of day-to-day details. However, LCE
and CSC indicate that the logistics/supply chain
manager not become so focused on the details of
PROCSTR, MKTGSTR, and INFOSTR that
they cannot respond to the dynamics of the big
picture.
Finally, Autry, Zacharia, and Lamb (2008) used
the responses of 254 respondents to create their
taxonomy of logistics strategy. Their findings
identified two logistics strategies that supported
the summarization stated in the previous
paragraph by Sharpiro and Heskett (1985).
Autry, Zacharia, and Lamb’s Strategy 1,
Functional Logistics Strategy (FL), emphasized
maximum efficiency. The emphasis of this
strategy includes inventory and order
management, order processing, procurement and
storage within the firm. Strategy 2, Externally
Oriented Logistics Strategy (FOL) emphasized
the ability to respond quickly and efficiently to
changing needs. FOL’s focus was on inter-firm
coordination, social responsibility, strategic
distribution planning, and leveraging technology
and information systems. Both strategies focused
on customer service, operational controls, and
transportation management. Here the authors
provided a third framework on which to evaluate
OLS and the conceptual structural model shown
as Figure 1. As a direct comparison, PROCSTR
could be classified as relating to FL while
MKTGSTR and INFOSTR could be classified as
relating to FOL.
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In any event, the authors see no inherent conflict
between the results of this research and the work
of Thompson (1967), Shapiro and Heskett
(1985), and Autry, Zacharia, and Lamb (2008).
All three provide insights that enhance the
understanding of the Bowersox/Daugherty
typology. However, the authors conclude that
the typology and structural model presented in
this manuscript provide a sound model for
understanding logistics and supply chain
management.

universally true in all situations, the results
presented in this manuscript indicate that
OLS>LCE>CSC>COMP is applicable in a wide
range of situations when conducting
comparative research into logistics/supply chain
management in a wide range of cross-cultural
scenarios. The extent to which this conclusion
holds will be supported or revised by future
research.

CONCLUSIONS

The research synthesized in this manuscript has
logistics/supply chain management implications
for practitioners, teachers, and researchers.
Because the Bowersox/Daugherty typology,
presented as Overall Logistics Strategy (OLS)
has been successfully used as a framework for
research into logistics/supply chain management
over time and in comparative culture research
using an array of data gathering methodologies it
is robust. This means that the insights gained
from the typology should be useful with a wide
range of audiences. For practitioners, the
concept of OLS>LCE>CSC>COMP provides a
straightforward framework for understanding
logistics/supply chain management as part of the
overall management of the firm and as a tool for
explaining that process to those in other areas of
the organization. The concept is also useful for
orienting those new to logistics/supply chain
management at the entry, middle, and upper
management levels so that they develop an
understanding of its context.

The purpose of this study was to explore
whether the Bowersox/Daugherty typology is a
useful instrument for examining logistics
strategies in countries of different sizes, cultures,
and economic systems. With logistics/supply
chain management as a major component in
business activity, it is imperative that managers
understand the role logistics/supply chain
management play in achieving organizational
competitiveness (COMP) as part of the overall
efforts of the firm. While a wide range of other
strategy considerations (such as product features,
promotional activities, pricing decisions, channel
of distribution choices, and technological
capabilities) play major roles in competitiveness,
it is crucial that the role logistics/supply chain
management plays in the overall organizational
strategy be fully understood. With supply chain
management at the center of business activity, it
is imperative that managers find and use new
ideas that will help them become more
competitive in highly competitive markets.
Finding new insights into how they can manage
their manufacturing and supply chains is
essential for goal attainment, profitability and
sustainability.
The Bowersox/Daugherty typology provides a
useful instrument for examining logistics/supply
chain management strategies in a wide range of
countries regardless of the geography, the
characteristics of the population, the nature of
the economy, the culture, and the level of
corruption. While this statement may not be
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IMPLICATIONS

For those teaching in logistics/supply chain
management, the OLS>LCE>CSC>COMP
concept provides a generalized framework that
provides a foundation for the specific topics
offered at the entry, advanced, MBA, and
graduate levels. The importance of
understanding the dichotomy of logistics/supply
chain management, discussed earlier, provide a
framework for helping students at all levels
understand the “paradox of administration” as it
applies to this area of expertise.

For logistics/supply chain management
researchers, the Bowersox/Daugherty typology
provides a framework that has been successfully
used in research for over twenty years. While
there are other models that may be useful, the
robustness of this typology provide one basis for
comparing future research results with previous
work.

Chen, H., P.J. Daugherty, and T.D. Landry
(2009), “Supply Chain Process Integration: A
Theoretical Framework,” Journal of Business
Logistics, 30(2): 27-46.

Future research into logistics/supply chain
management should seek opportunities to
explore practices in other countries/cultures.
Little is known of comparative logistics/supply
chain management in the various countries of
Asia and the subcontinent of India. Further,
logistics and supply chain management
practices, and their impact on customer service
and organizational competitive responsiveness
have not been systematically studied. In
addition, research into logistics and supply chain
management may benefit from expanding the
understanding of logistics/supply chain
management decision making by including
antecedents and moderating factors (such as
competition, market turbulence, and differences
in business environment) into the design.
Finally, further study of logistics/supply chain
management in other nations/cultures could be
gained by examining the relevance of the
Bowersox/Daugherty typology in
nonmanufacturing industries including retailing,
healthcare, financial services, transportation
firms, and food service. These industries may
provide a different perspective on the process,
market, and information strategy in their
different environments.

Hofstede, Geert (2001), Culture Consequences,
2nd Edition, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Publications.
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2. First level headings are 12 point, upper/lower case and bolded.
3. Second level headings are 12 point upper/lower case.
4. The body is NOT indented; rather a full blank line is left between paragraphs.
5. A full blank line should be left between all headings and paragraphs.
6. Unnecessary hard returns should not be used at the end of each line.
TABLES AND FIGURES
1. ONLY Tables and Figures are to appear in camera-ready format! Each table or figure should be
numbered in Arabic style (i.e., Table 1, Figure 2).
2. All tables MUST be typed using Microsoft Word for Windows table functions. Tables should
NOT be tabbed or spaced to align columns. Column headings should not be created as separate
tables. Table titles should NOT be created as part of the table. Table Titles should be 12 point upper
case and bold. All tables MUST be either 3 1/4 inches wide or 6 7/8 inches wide.
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3. All graphics MUST be saved in one of these formats: TIFF or JPG.
4. Tables and figures are NOT to be included unless directly referred to in the body of the manuscript.
5. Please remember that JTM is printed in black and white. Use of color and/or shading should be
avoided.
6. For accepted manuscripts, each table and/or figure should be printed on a separate page and included
at the end after References with the Table Title at the top in 12 point, upper case and bold.
7. Placement of tables and figures in the manuscript should be indicated as follows:
——————————————————
Table or Figure (#) About Here
—————————————————
EQUATIONS, CITATIONS, REFERENCES, ENDNOTES, APPENDIXES, ETC.
1. Equations are placed on a separate line with a blank line both above and below, and numbered in
parentheses, flush right. Examples:
y = c + ax + bx
y = a + 1x + 2x + 3x + ax
2. References within the text should include the author’s last name and year of publication enclosed in
parentheses, e.g. (Wilson, 2004; Manrodt and Rutner, 2004). For more than one cite in the same
location, references should be in chronological order. For more than one cite in the same year,
alphabetize by author name, such as (Wilson, 2001; Mandrodt, 2002; Rutner, 2002; Wilson, 2003). If
practical, place the citation just ahead of a punctuation mark. If the author’s name is used within the
text sentence, just place the year of publication in parentheses, e.g., “According to Manrodt and Rutner
(2003) ...,”. For multiple authors, use up to three names in the citation. With four or more authors, use
the lead author and et al., (Wilson et al., 2004). References from the Internet should contain the site
name, author/organization if available, date the page/site was created, date page/site was accessed, and
complete web addresses sufficient to find the cited work.
3. Endnotes may be used when necessary. Create endnotes in 10-point font and place them in a separate
section at the end of the text before References. (1, 2, etc.). Note: Endnotes should be explanatory in
nature and not for reference purposes. Endnotes should NOT be created in Microsoft Insert Footnotes/
Endnotes system. The Endnotes section should be titled in 12 point, uppercase and bolded.
4. All references should be in block style. Hanging indents are not to be used.
5. Appendices follow the body of the text and references and each should be headed by a title of
APPENDIX (#) in caps and 12 Point, and bolded.
6. The list of references cited in the manuscript should immediately follow the body of the text in
alphabetical order, with the lead author’s surname first and the year of publication following all author
names. The Reference Section should be headed with REFERENCES in caps, bolded, and in 12 point
font. Work by the same author with the same year of publication should be distinguished by lower case
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letters after the date (e.g., 1996a). For author names that repeat, in the same order, in subsequent
cites, substitute a .5 inch underline for each name that repeats. Authors’ initials should have a space
between the initials, e.g., Smith, Jr., H. E., Timon, III., P. S. R., etc. A blank line should separate each
reference in the list. Do not number references.
7. All references to journals, books, etc., are italicized, NOT underlined. Examples are as follows:
Journal Article:
Pohlen, Terrance L. (2003), “A Framework for Evaluating Supply Chain Performance,” Journal of
Transportation Management, 14(2): 1-21.
Book Chapter:
Manrodt, Karl (2003), “Drivers of Logistics Excellence: Implications for Carriers,” In J. W. Wilson
(Ed.), Logistics and Transportation Research Yearbook 2003 (pp. 126-154) Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Book:
Coyle, John J., Bardi, Edward J., and Novack, RobertA. (2004), Transportation, 6th ed., Cincinnati,
OH: South-Western College Publishing.
Website:
Wilson, J. W. (2003), “Adapting to the Threat of Global Terrorism: Reinventing Your Supply
Chain,” [On-line]. Available: http//:georgiasouthern.edu/coba/centers/lit/threat.doc. Created: 11/01/
02, Accessed: 11/12/03.
MANUSCRIPT SAMPLE
A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SUPPLY CHAIN PERFORMANCE
Terrance L. Pohlen, University of North Texas
ABSTRACT
Managers require measures spanning multiple enterprises to increase supply chain competitiveness
and to increase the value delivered to the end-customer. Despite the need for supply chain metrics,
there is little evidence that any firms are successfully measuring and evaluating inter-firm
performance. Existing measures continue to capture intrafirm performance and focus on traditional
measures. The lack of a framework to simultaneously measure and translate inter-firm performance
into value creation has largely contributed to this situation. This article presents a framework that
overcomes these shortcomings by measuring performance across multiple firms and translating
supply chain performance into shareholder value.
INTRODUCTION
The ability to measure supply chain performance remains an elusive goal for managers in most
companies. Few have implemented supply chain management or have visibility of performance
across multiple companies (Supply Chain Solutions, 1998; Keeler et al., 1999; Simatupang and
Journal of Transportation Management

Sridharan, 2002). Supply chain management itself lacks a widely accepted definition (Akkermans,
1999), and many managers substitute the term for logistics or supplier management (Lambert and
Pohlen, 2001). As a result, performance measurement tends to be functionally or internally focused
and does not capture supply chain performance (Gilmour, 1999; Supply Chain Management, 200 I) .
At best, existing measures only capture how immediate upstream suppliers and downstream
customers drive performance within a single firm.
———————————————
Table 1 about here
———————————————
Developing and Costing Performance Measures
ABC is a technique for assigning the direct and indirect resources of a firm to the activities
consuming the resources and subsequently tracing the cost of performing these activities to the
products, customers, or supply chains consuming the activities (La Londe and Pohlen, 1996). An
activity-based approach increases costing accuracy by using multiple drivers to assign costs whereas
traditional cost accounting frequently relies on a very limited number of allocation bases.
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